企业风险态度与需求波动对BOT合同设计的影响  

Impact of corporate risk attitude and demand uncertainty on BOT contract design

作　　者：熊明华 XIONG Minghua(School of Management,Foshan University,Foshan 528000,China)

机构地区：[1]佛山大学管理学院,广东佛山528000

出　　处：《佛山科学技术学院学报(社会科学版)》2025年第1期52-58,共7页Journal of Foshan University(Social Science Edition)

基　　金：广东省哲学社会科学规划项目(GD23YGL05);广东省基础与应用基础研究基金(2023A1515110889)。

摘　　要：BOT模式已经广泛应用于交通基础设施建设。但市场需求的不确定性以及企业管理者的不同风险态度,可能会对BOT合同产生一定的影响。考虑到企业风险态度和需求的不确定性,构建一个一般化的博弈模型,可探讨企业风险态度和需求波动对BOT合同设计的影响。政府最优的特许经营期取决于政府的运营成本,当政府的运营成本较高时,政府倾向于选择项目生命周期作为特许经营期。当企业为风险厌恶时,企业收费随需求波动递减;反之,当企业为风险偏好时,企业收费随需求波动递增。需求波动增加,不利于企业利润。然而,需求波动对社会福利的影响受到企业风险态度影响,研究发现政府应当与风险厌恶型企业合作。Build-Operate-Transfer(BOT)model has been widely applied in transportation infrastructure projects.However,market demand uncertainty and varying risk attitudes of corporate managers can significantly impact BOT contracts.This paper considers both risk attitudes and demand uncertainty to construct a stylized model,exploring the effects of these factors on the design of BOT contracts.The research findings indicate that the optimal concession period for the government depends on its operational costs.When the government's operational costs are high,it tends to choose the project's lifecycle as the concession period.For risk-averse(risk-seeking)companies,their pricing decreases(increases)with demand fluctuations.Increased demand fluctuations are detrimental to corporate profits.However,the impact of demand fluctuations on social welfare is influenced by corporate risk attitudes,with the study suggesting that the government should collaborate with risk-averse companies.

关 键 词：BOT项目 合同设计 风险态度 需求波动 特许经营期 

分 类 号：F283[经济管理—国民经济]