机构投资者注意力分散与公司欺诈  

Institutional Investor Distraction and Corporate Fraud

作　　者：胡海峰[1] 杨景云 Hu Haifeng;Yang Jingyun(Business School,Beijing Normal University,Beijing 100875,China)

机构地区：[1]北京师范大学经济与工商管理学院,北京100875

出　　处：《东方论坛—青岛大学学报(社会科学版)》2025年第1期23-47,共25页Eastern Forum(JOURNAL OF QINGDAO UNIVERSITY)

基　　金：国家社会科学基金重点项目“中国资本市场韧性的影响因素、测度与提升路径研究”(21AJL012)的阶段性成果。

摘　　要：机构投资者对上市公司的监督与其注意力分配有关,研究机构投资者注意力分散如何影响上市公司欺诈,对于防范上市公司欺诈行为具有重要意义。研究构建机构投资者注意力分散度指标,实证分析机构投资者注意力分散对上市公司欺诈的影响。结果表明,机构投资者注意力分散会导致上市公司实施欺诈的概率提高。进一步研究发现,重大经营事项和董事会结构会对机构投资者注意力分散的后果产生影响。上市公司并购活动会弱化机构投资者注意力分散对欺诈稽查的抑制作用;独立董事比例的提高能够弱化机构投资者注意力分散对欺诈实施的促进作用,但会强化机构投资者注意力分散对欺诈稽查的抑制作用。The supervision of listed companies by institutional investors is related to their allocation of attention.Studying how the distraction of institutional investors'attention affects fraud in listed companies is of significant importance for preventing fraudulent activities in these firms.This paper constructs an indicator for distraction of institutional investors and empirically analyzes the impact of this attention dispersion on fraud in listed companies.The results indicate that the distraction of institutional investors increases the probability of fraud occurring in listed companies.Further research reveals that significant operational events and board structure influence the consequences of their distraction.Additionally,merger and acquisition activities in listed companies weaken the suppressive effect of distraction on fraud detection.An increased proportion of independent directors can mitigate the promoting effect of distraction on fraud implementation,while simultaneously enhancing its suppressive effect on fraud detection.

关 键 词：上市公司 公司欺诈 机构投资者 有限关注 

分 类 号：F832.5[经济管理—金融学] F275