金融供给侧改革下的农村商业银行信用风险管理研究——以四川A农商行为例  

On Credit Risk Management of Rural Commercial Banks in the Context of Financial Supply-Side Structural Reform—A Case Study of Sichuan A Rural Commercial Bank

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作  者:李君[1] 戴佳琳 Li Jun;Dai Jialin(Xihua University,Chengdu 610039)

机构地区:[1]西华大学,成都610039

出  处:《西部学刊》2025年第4期41-44,共4页Journal of Western

摘  要:当前,农村商业银行的主要经营风险仍为信用贷款风险。以四川A农商行为例,分析其近3年数据发现,其信贷结构与质量总体较好,不良贷款率逐年减少且拨备覆盖率有所上升,但核心一级资本充足率与资本充足率均呈逐年下降趋势,表明其抵御风险能力较差。其经营主要面临银行同业竞争加剧、疫情期间的风险冲击、关于涉农产品信贷风险的处置方式单一、资本充足率加剧经营风险和贷款过度依赖担保方式等风险挑战。对策建议:(一)多参与同业交流;(二)强化政策扶持,增强农商行自身抗风险能力;(三)丰富农商行涉农信贷产品的风险处置措施;(四)完善自身制度,提高发展水平。Currently,the credit risk remains the main operational risk for rural commercial banks.Taking Sichuan A Rural Commercial Bank as an example,this paper analyzes its data over the past three years and finds that its loan structure and quality are generally good,with a yearly decrease in the non-performing loan(NPL)ratio and an increase in the provision coverage ratio.However,both the core Tier 1 capital adequacy ratio and the capital adequacy ratio show a yearly downward trend,indicating a weaker ability to resist risks.Its operations mainly face risks and challenges such as intensified competition among peer banks,risk shocks during the pandemic,limited approaches to dealing with credit risks associated with agricultural products,increased operational risks due to capital adequacy ratio,and excessive reliance on guarantee methods for loans.Countermeasures are accordingly put forward:(1)increasing participation in interbank exchanges;(2)strengthening policy support to enhance the risk resistance capability of rural commercial banks;(3)diversifying the risk disposal measures for agricultural credit products of rural commercial banks;(4)improving internal systems to raise the level of development.

关 键 词:农商银行 信用风险 不良贷款 

分 类 号:F832.35[经济管理—金融学]

 

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