How to govern greenwashing behaviors in green finance products:a tripartite evolutionary game approach  

作　　者：Changyu Liu Wei Li Le Chang Qiang Ji 

机构地区：[1]Business School,Shandong Normal University,Ji’nan,250014,China [2]School of Economics and Management,Shandong Agriculture and Engineering University,Ji’nan,250100,China [3]Institutes of Science and Development,Chinese Academy of Sciences,Beijing,100190,China [4]School of Public Policy and Management,University of Chinese Academy of Sciences,Beijing,100049,China

出　　处：《Financial Innovation》2024年第1期3123-3154,共32页金融创新(英文)

基　　金：Supports from the National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant Nos.72348003,72022020 and 71974181;the National Social Science Foundation of China under Grant No.20BJL058 are acknowledged.

摘　　要：Greenwashing behaviors(GWBs)in green finance products(GFPs)by enterprises seriously hinder the realization of environmental protection goals.However,methods for effectively regulating GWBs in GFPs are unclear.This study constructed a tripartite evolutionary game model to analyze the formation and governance mechanisms of GWBs in GFPs among regulatory authorities,enterprises,and investors.Subsequently,the stability equilibrium strategy and key factors influencing the system equilibrium were discussed.Several interesting conclusions were drawn.First,we demonstrated that an interdependence mechanism exists among three game agents who mutually influence each other.The larger the probability of regulatory authorities choosing active supervision and investors adopting feedback,the more enterprises are willing to carry out green projects.Second,three corresponding governance modes for GWBs were put forward following the developmental stages of GFPs.Among these,the collaboration mode is the most effective in incentivizing enterprises to implement green projects.Third,based on sensitivity simulations,the initial willingness of the tripartite stakeholders,investor feedback cost,investor compensation,the penalty for greenwashing enterprises,and the reputational benefit of enterprises are critical factors that influence evolutionary results.Finally,targeted countermeasures were provided for regulatory authorities to prevent enterprises from engaging in GWBs.

关 键 词：Evolutionary game Green fnance product Green washing behaviors Investor feedback 

分 类 号：F42[经济管理—产业经济]