地方政府-人大官员流动与预算监督绩效  

Local Government-People s Congress Official Mobility and Budget Supervision Performance

作　　者：李一花[1,2] 丁文文 LI Yihua;DING Wenwen

机构地区：[1]山东大学经济学院 [2]山东大学国家治理研究院

出　　处：《中央财经大学学报》2025年第2期88-104,共17页Journal of Central University of Finance & Economics

摘　　要：笔者首次基于地方政府-人大官员流动的视角,系统考察我国地方人大预算的“合作型监督”模式能否以及如何提升预算监督绩效。研究发现:地方人大官员的政府部门工作经历,尤其是在财政、审计部门的工作经历能够显著提升预算监督绩效,且随政府部门任职工作年限呈倒U型关系。该结论在多种稳健性检验后保持不变。异质性分析发现,官员流动对预算监督绩效的影响在经济发展水平低、财政压力大、省级人大常委会主任由省委书记兼任的地区更加显著;同时,在时间维度上,2015年《预算法》实施以及预算联网监督后更加明显。本文的研究对进一步优化政府官员流动和提升人大预算监督绩效具有重要的政策启示。Based on the perspective of the flow of local government-People s Congress officials,this paper systematically examines whether and how the“cooperative supervision”mode of local people s Congress budgets in China can improve the performance of budget management.It is found that the working experience of local people s Congress officials in government departments,especially in finance and auditing departments,can significantly improve the performance of budget supervision,and the relationship is inverted U-shaped with the working years of government departments.This conclusion remained unchanged after multiple robustness tests.Heterogeneity analysis shows that the impact of official mobility on budget supervision performance is more significant in regions with low economic development level,high financial pressure,and where the chairman of the Standing Committee of the provincial People s Congress is a provincial Party secretary.At the same time,in the time dimension,the implementation of the Budget Law in 2015 and the supervision of the budget network are more obvious.The research in this paper has important policy implications for further optimizing the flow of government officials and improving the budget supervision performance of the People s Congress.

关 键 词：官员流动 人大预算监督 预算监督绩效 合作型监督 

分 类 号：F812.3[经济管理—财政学] D630.3[政治法律—政治学]