我国省级以上官员注意力分配的研究——以省级以上领导视察为切口  

A Study on the Attention Distribution of Provincial and Higher-Level Officials in China:Focusing on Inspections by Provincial and Higher-Level Leaders

作　　者：徐晶 Jing Xu

机构地区：[1]清华大学社会科学学院政治学系

出　　处：《公共行政评论》2025年第1期107-125,198,199,共21页Journal of Public Administration

摘　　要：领导视察是促进政策执行的一项重要工具,也是官员注意力分配的重要体现。研究收集了2000年至2017年全国地级市获得省级以上各类领导视察的信息,形成了横跨18年的城市面板数据。通过使用双向固定效应、空间回归等多种计量方法,研究发现,城市的政策资源是影响城市获得领导视察的基础性因素,而城市的空间特征则带来了注意力的“挤出效应”。此外,更高层领导的视察会促进下级官员对相同地点进行视察,即存在注意力的“对齐效应”。不同于传统观点关注官员注意力的被动分配逻辑,论文提出了官员注意力的分配具有自主性,不同级别官员的视察具有差异性。通过探讨作为政策执行“高位推动”形式之一的官员注意力分配的各类效应,论文为探索我国高层官员注意力分配的政治经济学逻辑提供了新的经验证据。Leader inspections are an important tool for promoting policy implementation and a key method for measuring the allocation of officialsattention.This study collected information on inspections by various leaders at or above the provincial level in all prefecture-level cities nationwide from 2000 to 2017,forming an 18-year city panel dataset.By using multiple econometric methods such as two-way fixed effects and spatial regression,this paper finds that a citys policy resources are the fundamental factor influencing its likelihood of receiving leader inspections,while the citys spatial characteristics bring about a crowding-out effect on attention.Additionally,inspections by higher-level leaders promote subordinate officials to inspect the same locations,indicating an attention alignment effect.Contrary to the traditional view that focuses on the passive allocation logic of officialsattention,this study proposes that the allocation of officialsattention is autonomous,and inspections by officials at different levels are differentiated.By exploring the various effects of officialsattention allocation as one form of“top-down”policy implementation,this paper provides new empirical evidence for exploring the political economy logic of senior officialsattention allocation in China.

关 键 词：领导视察 注意力分配 政策执行 地级城市 

分 类 号：D63[政治法律—政治学]