地方干部激励绩效改革对努力分配的影响研究  

Exploration of the Impact on Local Cadre Incentive Performance Reform on Effort Distortion

作　　者：文静 于晓元 王爱琴 WEN Jing;YU Xiaoyuan;WANG Aiqin(School of Business,Xi’an University of Finance and Economics,Xi’an 710100,China;School of Economics and Management,Xi’an University of Electronic Science and Technology,Xi’an 710126,China)

机构地区：[1]西安财经大学商学院,陕西西安710100 [2]西安电子科技大学经济与管理学院,陕西西安710126

出　　处：《西安财经大学学报》2025年第1期117-129,共13页Journal of Xi’an University of Finance and Economics

基　　金：陕西省哲学社会科学研究专项智库项目“数字赋能陕西省县域智慧城镇一体化发展策略研究”(2024ZD501)。

摘　　要：当前中国经济已由高速增长阶段转向高质量发展阶段,党的二十大报告指出“高质量发展是全面建设社会主义现代化国家的首要任务”。经济发展速度和质量这一辩证统一问题,一直是中国经济发展相关政策领域的探讨热点。本文探讨在绩效考核权重的改革下,中国地方干部在晋升激励的引导下是否正确地以适当放缓经济增长为代价提升辖区内的环境质量。本文通过使用差分法框架分析,发现这一改革激励地方干部减少了平均碳排放量,同时也降低了GDP增长率,尤其在GDP竞争中不占优势的地方干部更有动力降低GDP增长率,以实现更高的减排绩效。对照地方干部在晋升关键期和非晋升关键期的主观表现之后,进一步分离出改革的努力扭曲效应。地方干部努力扭曲的本质是对资本积累和分配的过度干预。中国地方干部激励绩效改革深刻地影响了经济发展趋势,对于精准定位地方干部职责及政府职能,充分发挥地方政府推动经济高质量发展具有积极作用,对于实现社会主义现代化建设的宏伟目标具有重要意义。At present,China’s economy has shifted from a stage of high-speed growth to a stage of high-quality development.The report of the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China pointed out that“high-quality development is the primary task of comprehensively building a socialist modernized country.”.The dialectical unity of economic development speed and quality has always been a hot topic in the policy field related to China’s economic development.This article explores whether local officials in China,guided by promotion incentives,have correctly improved the environmental quality of their jurisdictions at the cost of appropriately slowing down economic growth under the reform of performance evaluation weights.At the end of 2013,the Chinese central government clarified the importance of environmental protection surpassing GDP growth in determining the promotion of local cadres.This article analyzes using the difference method framework and finds that this reform has incentivized local officials to reduce average carbon emissions while also reducing GDP growth rate.Local officials who do not have an advantage in GDP competition are particularly motivated to reduce GDP growth rates in order to achieve higher emission reduction performance.After comparing the subjective performance of local cadres during the critical promotion period and non critical promotion period,further separate the distortion effect of reform efforts.Finally,this study demonstrates that the essence of distorted efforts by local officials is excessive intervention in capital accumulation and distribution.The reform of incentive performance for local cadres in China has deeply influenced the trend of China’s economic development.In the new era,it is of great significance to accurately position the responsibilities of local cadres and government functions,fully leverage the positive role of local governments in promoting high-quality economic development,and thus achieve the grand goal of socialist modernization construction.

关 键 词：绩效排名晋升制度 多指标考核 环境质量 碳排放 GDP增长 

分 类 号：F014.4[经济管理—政治经济学] D630.3[政治法律—政治学]