董秘兼任能提高公司信息披露质量吗?——基于管理层讨论与分析可读性视角  

Can Board Secretary Concurrency Improve the Quality of Corporate Disclosure:A Study from the Perspective of MD&A Readability

作　　者：顾水彬[1] GU Shuibin

机构地区：[1]江苏大学财经学院

出　　处：《暨南学报(哲学社会科学版)》2024年第12期146-167,共22页Jinan Journal(Philosophy and Social Sciences)

基　　金：国家社会科学基金青年项目“金融科技背景下分析师信息披露行为的机制及监管”(21CJY040);国家社会科学基金一般项目“总体国家安全观视域下基于大数据的企业竞争情报感知能力提升研究”(21BTQ070);国家留学基金项目“可持续发展信息披露与企业创新研究”(202308320244)。

摘　　要：本文基于公司治理理论提出董秘兼任对公司信息披露质量可能存在负向影响的论断,并以我国2011—2022年沪深A股上市公司为样本,爬虫抓取数据展开了时间和行业双向固定效应的实证检验、不同董秘兼任类型的分组检验、PSM-DID等稳健性检验,以及不同监督约束环境下的异质性检验。研究发现,董秘兼任降低了公司信息披露质量,与董秘兼任经理层相比,董事长、执行董事兼任董秘对公司信息披露质量的降低程度更高,而且董秘兼任对公司信息披露质量的影响在盈余管理高、内部控制弱、媒体关注低等环境下更加突出。本文对启示有关部门修订规范董秘兼任要求提升信息披露质量具有重要政策意义。In China,over 70%of listed companies have board secretaries who concurrently hold other positions.While it is common for board secretaries to serve as chief financial officers(CFOs)in Western countries,China additionally witnesses numerous cases of board chairmen,executive directors,or general managers concurrently holding the role of board secretary.This study posits that such dual roles may result in energy dispersion,reduced effectiveness,and conflicts of interest,ultimately diminishing the quality of corporate information disclosure.To test this hypothesis,this paper conducts empirical analyses using data from A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen between 2011 and 2022 and focuses on the readability of management discussion and analysis(MD&A)sections.First,applying a two-way fixed effects model that accounts for both time and industry,this paper finds that the concurrent appointment of board secretaries significantly reduces the quality of corporate disclosure.Second,categorizing different types of concurrent roles,this paper observes that regardless of whether the board chairman,executive directors,or general managers concurrently hold the secretary position,the quality of corporate disclosure declines.The negative impact is more pronounced when the board chairman or executive directors hold the secretary role compared to general managers.These findings remain consistent across multiple robustness tests,including propensity score matching-difference-in-differences(PSM-DID),instrumental variable-Heckman models,and an alternative methodology for evaluating corporate disclosure quality.Lastly,cross-sectional analyses reveal that the detrimental effects of concurrent appointments are particularly pronounced in contexts characterized by high earnings management,weak internal controls,and limited media oversight,which demonstrates that holding multiple roles reduces the board secretary s ability to internal surveillance and governance,thereby diminishing the quality of information disclosure.This study

关 键 词：董秘兼任 信息披露 文本分析 Python爬取 上市公司数据 

分 类 号：F832.51[经济管理—金融学]