银行市场势力与银行稳定  

Bank Market Power and Bank Stability

作　　者：王国红[1] Wang Guohong

机构地区：[1]湖北经济学院,湖北省武汉市

出　　处：《金融学季刊》2024年第2期101-126,共26页Quarterly Journal of Finance

基　　金：国家社会科学基金一般项目(17BJY236)的资助

摘　　要：银行稳定是金融乃至经济行稳致远的“压舱石”。本文从市场势力角度,以2004~2022年中国203家银行为样本,考察银行市场势力对银行稳定的影响,研究发现:银行市场势力与银行稳定呈现显著的倒“U”形关系,即较低程度的市场势力有利于银行稳定,高市场势力妨碍银行稳定,其转折点在勒纳指数为0.5243附近。现阶段中国银行业的市场势力较低,在一定程度上促进了银行稳定,但却以银行效率损失和不良贷款比率上升为代价。因此,中国银行业竞争政策的制定,一方面不宜盲目打压银行市场势力,一味追求银行竞争性的提高;另一方面,应权衡银行稳定与银行效率间的关系,根据目标的轻重缓急决定取舍。Banking industry stability is the“ballast stone”for the steady path to the future of finance and even economy.From the perspective of market power,this paper takes203Chinese banks from 2004 to 2022 as samples to investigate the impact of bank market power on bank stability,and finds that:There is a significant inverted U-shaped relationship between China’s bank market power and bank stability,that is,a low degree of market power is conducive to bank stability,but a high degree of market power hinders bank stability,and its inflection point is around the Lerner Index of 0.5243.At present,the market power level of China's banking industry is low,which promotes the stability of banks to a certain extent.However,it is at the cost of the loss of bank efficiency and the rise of non-performing loan ratio.Therefore,the formulation of China’s banking competition policy should not blindly suppress the market power of banks to pursue the improvement of bank competitiveness.On the other hand,we should weigh the relationship between bank stability and bank efficiency,and make tradeoffs based on the priority of goals.

关 键 词：中国银行业 银行市场势力 银行稳定 

分 类 号：F832[经济管理—金融学]