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作 者:梁志会 张俊飚 LIANG Zhihui;ZHANG Junbiao
机构地区:[1]中南财经政法大学工商管理学院,武汉430073 [2]浙江农林大学浙江省乡村振兴研究院,杭州311300
出 处:《农业经济问题》2025年第2期52-65,共14页Issues in Agricultural Economy
基 金:中国博士后基金国家资助博士后研究人员计划项目“长江经济带农业绿色发展的理论机制、空间建构及治理响应研究”(编号:GZC20233142);国家社会科学基金重点项目“基于经济高质量发展的农业自然资源高效利用研究”(编号:20AZD091);中南财经政法大学中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金(编号:2722024BQ043)。
摘 要:农业规模经营是中国农业组织制度变革的政策导向,在实践中逐渐形成土地规模经营与服务规模经营二元图谱。然而,由于组织规模存在模糊性,传统的“企业—市场”及“内部—外部”规模经济两分范式对农业规模经济生成机制的解释效力趋于弱化。本文基于现代企业理论,从合约视角考察农业经营组织制度,旨在更好地理解农业规模经营的本质。研究表明,农业家庭经营具有合约性质,无论是土地规模经营还是服务规模经营,本质上均可还原为一组不完全要素合约的缔结与执行过程。其形成逻辑在于,经营主体遵循能力差异所蕴含的比较优势原则,利用各类合约来治理资源产权的细分与转让,实现产权专业化。在此过程中,合约治理受到私有产权和交易费用的约束。前一个约束条件意味着主体对所属资产拥有自由处置的权利;后一个约束条件意味着合约缔结和执行面临一个正的交易费用,导致合约的不完全性,致使资源的部分产权留在公共领域,最终带来租值耗散问题。由此,农业合约治理的响应逻辑在于最小化租值耗散。Agriculturalscale management is the policy direction of China's agricultural organization system reform.Land scale management and servicescale management are generally regarded as the dual spectrum of agricultural scale management.However,due to the fuzziness of organization scale,the binary paradigm of“enterprise-market”and“internal-external”economies of scale of traditional firm theory is weak in explaining the mechanism of agricultural scale economy.In order to better understand the nature of agricultural scale management,this paper examines agricultural management organization system from the perspective of contract based on modern enterprise theory.The research shows that agricultural family management itself has the nature of contract,whether it is the model of land scale management or service scale management,it can be reduced to the conclusion and execution process of a group of incomplete factor contracts in essence.The logic of its formation is that the management entity follows the principle of comparative advantage contained in the difference of ability,and uses various contracts to govern the subdivision and transfer of resource property rights,so as to realize property specialization.In this process,contract governance is constrained by private property rights and transaction costs.The former constraint means that the entity has the right to freely transfer the assets it owns.The latter constraint means that the conclusion and execution of the contract are faced with a positive transaction cost,which usually leads to the incompleteness of the contract,resulting in part of the property rights of resources remaining in the public domain,and ultimately the problem of rent dissipation.Therefore,the management of agricultural contracts is based on the minimization of rent dissipation.
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