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作 者:于晓辉 王成林[1] 张志强[1] 刘鸽 李郑思伊 YU Xiaohui;WANG Chenglin;ZHANG Zhiqiang;LIU Ge;LI Zhengsiyi(School of Logistics,Beijing Wuzi University,Beijing 101149,China;Institute of Carbon Peak and Neutrality,Beijing Wuzi University,Beijing 101149,China)
机构地区:[1]北京物资学院物流学院,北京101149 [2]北京物资学院双碳研究院,北京101149
出 处:《运筹与管理》2024年第10期51-57,共7页Operations Research and Management Science
基 金:北京市教委社科重点项目(SZ202310037015);国家自然科学基金资助项目(72171024);北京长城学者项目(CIT&tcd20180319);2022年度北京市属高校教师队伍建设支持计划优秀青年人才项目(BPHR202203154)。
摘 要:面对日益减少的商业用地,为缓解企业因此而带来的库存成本增多、供货缓慢等问题,横向府际间的异地库存和收益共享是双方发展、共赢的必经之路。考虑政府所在地的物流服务水平,建立物流产业转移背景下横向府际间的演化博弈模型,在一定的惩罚机制下分别研究无政府约束、中央政府约束和横向政府自我约束三种情形下的演化稳定条件。研究表明:在无约束下,无法实现双方政府的合作;在中央政府约束和自我约束下,可以实现双方政府的合作,但是对于政府之间的收入分享比例有一定的要求,中央政府相比横向政府自我约束,收入分享比例约束的调节范围更高,而调节的效率较低。A decrease in commercial land has brought some problems to enterprises,such as increasing inventory costs and slow supply.In order to alleviate the above problems,more and more companies are registering in developed areas or urban areas,while establishing off-site inventory in underdeveloped areas or non-urban areas.However,to some extent,the logistics industry transfer has led to the problem of imbalanced tax benefits between governments of two regions.Thus,in order to ensure the effective transfer or evacuation of logistics functions in enterprises,it is urgent to establish an effective incentive mechanism for horizontal intergovernmental cooperation.To achieve the balance of interests between horizontal governments,we can adopt such restraint mechanisms as revenue sharing,risk sharing,and punishment to achieve a win-win cooperation.Based on the perspective of bounded rationality,we introduce the proportion of revenue sharing,establishes an evolutionary game model between developed and underdeveloped regional governments,and simulate the evolution process of horizontal intergovernmental cooperation strategies.Under the three mechanisms(no constraint,central government coordination and horizontal government self-restraint),we respectively analyze cooperation evolution strategies and profit sharing ratio between horizontal governments,study the promotion effect of different constraint mechanisms on horizontal intergovernmental cooperation,so as to promote horizontal intergovernmental cooperation and provide a certain decision support.The research shows that two governments cannot obtain evolutionarily stable strategy without constraints.Under the constraints of the central government,the tax sharing ratio cannot be too high,otherwise local governments cannot cooperate.Compared with the government’s self-regulation,the regulation scope of profit sharing proportion restriction under the constraints of the central government is high,and the regulation efficiency is low.The central government should strengthen its
分 类 号:N945.25[自然科学总论—系统科学]
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