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作 者:王嘉怡 夏梁[1] 刘晓润 WANG Jiayi;XIA Liang;LIU Xiaorun(Institute of Economic Research,Hubei Academy of Social Sciences,Wuhan,Hubei 430077,China;Coolege of Finance and Statistics Hunan Vniversity,Changsha,Hunan 410083,China)
机构地区:[1]湖北省社会科学院经济研究所,湖北武汉430077 [2]湖南大学金融与统计学院,湖南长沙410083
出 处:《荆楚理工学院学报》2025年第1期67-80,共14页Journal of Jingchu University of Technology
摘 要:为探究委托代理机制下政府集中采购中可能存在的寻租行为,分析供应商、政府采购中心和政府采购监管部门之间的利益冲突和博弈情景,以政府集中采购为研究对象,对供应商、政府采购中心和政府采购监管部门之间信息不对称和利益分配进行分析,构建供应商、采购人员和政府监管部门三方演化博弈模型,分析这一系统中均衡点的稳定性,并分析商品或服务市场价值、寻租成本等因素对演化过程及结果的影响,最后利用Matlab2023a进行仿真分析。研究结果表明,在委托代理机制导致政府采购中各方之间利益冲突,存在供应商与采购人寻租的潜在风险。基于研究结果,提出优化政府采购机制的政策建议,包括提升商品或服务市场价值、提高寻租成本、加大处罚力度等。Government procurement is an important economic activity for government departments,reflecting the public functions undertaken by the government.Centralized procurement is a representative form of government procurement activities.In recent years,China's system of government centralized procurement has developed rapidly.However,due to the presence of multi-level delegated agency relationships in government centralized procurement,rent-seeking and corruption phenomena still exist to a certain extent.This paper takes government centralized procurement as the research object,constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model involving suppliers,procurement personnel,and government regulatory departments.It analyzes the stability of equilibrium points in this system and examines the impact of factors such as the market value of goods or services and rent-seeking costs on the evolutionary process and outcomes.Finally,using Matlab2023a for simulation analysis,the research results show that the delegated agency mechanism leads to conflicts of interest among various parties in government procurement,with potential risks of rent-seeking between suppliers and procurement personnel.Based on the research results,policy recommendations for optimizing the government procurement mechanism are proposed,including enhancing the market value of goods or services,increasing rent-seeking costs,and strengthening penalties.
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