政府监管与企业趋利的演化博弈基于数据安全监管机制的分析  

Evolutionary Game of Government Regulation and Enterprise Profit-Seeking:An Analysis Based on Data Security Supervision Mechanism

作　　者：温志强[1] 王妃 胡峰 Wen Zhiqiang;Wang Fei;Hu Feng(Institute of National Governance,Tianjin Normal University,Tianjin 300387,China;Tianjin Research Institute of Emergency Foreign Language Service,Tianjin 300204,China;Jiangsu Institute of Science and Technology Development Strategy,Nanjing 210042,China)

机构地区：[1]天津师范大学国家治理研究院,天津300387 [2]天津市应急外语服务研究院,天津300204 [3]江苏省科学技术发展战略研究院,江苏南京210042

出　　处：《科技管理研究》2024年第24期169-179,共11页Science and Technology Management Research

基　　金：国家社会科学基金一般项目“‘互联网+监管’对营商环境的影响研究”(23BZZ039);天津市教育委员会社会科学重大项目“基于人类命运共同体的应急语言服务体系构建研究”(2023JWZD30)。

摘　　要：近年来,企业数据安全问题的频发对国家安全构成严重威胁。尽管国家已出台多项政策法规,但数据安全监管仍面临问题发现难、调查取证难、管理成本高等多重挑战,且因企业逐利本性致使政府监管与企业逐利形成二元博弈态势,进一步加大政府安全监管的难度。然而,现有研究对于政府和企业二元主体博弈的关注较少。为此,从政府发挥主导作用的宏观视角出发,通过引入演化博弈理论,进行静态博弈场景与动态博弈态势分析,确定监管成功率、第三方举报概率等10项策略影响参数,宏观分析政府监管与企业趋利博弈的进化稳定态势,从政府资源有限视角给出监管企业数据安全的最佳机制路径。结果显示:第三方参与意识不足会造成政府和企业在不良状态中形成不良循环,同时对企业惩罚的适度性也极为重要;在杜绝企业因不注重数据安全而引发风险时,不仅需要政府监管时对企业进行有效惩罚,也需要企业或民众对不注重数据安全行为的举报与监督。最后,结合政府资源有限视角提出协作路径、资源路径、政策路径、信息路径4类12条监管机制进路。In recent years,the frequent occurrence of corporate data security incidents has posed a serious threat to national security.Despite the enactment of multiple policies and regulations,data security supervision faces persistent challenges,including difficulty in problem identification,investigation and evidence collection,and high regulatory costs.Moreover,the profit-driven nature of enterprises creates a binary game between government regulation and corporate profit-seeking,complicating the government's efforts in security supervision.However,research focusing on the binary game between government and corporate entities is relatively scarce.To address this gap,this study adopts a macro perspective with the government playing a leading role,introduces evolutionary game theory,and conducts static and dynamic game analysis.Ten strategic impact parameters,including regulatory success rate and third-party reporting probability,are identified to analyze the evolutionary stable states of the government-enterprise game.From the perspective of limited government resources,the study proposes the optimal mechanism for regulating corporate data security.The results reveal that inadequate third-party participation can lead to a vicious cycle between government and enterprises in adverse states,while the appropriateness of corporate punishment is also crucial.To mitigate risks arsing from enterprises'neglect of data security,effective government enforcement and active reporting and supervision by enterprises or the public are essential.Finally,the study proposes four categories of regulatory mechanisms—collaborative,resource,policy,and information pathways—comprising 12 specific approaches,tailored to the constraints of limited governmental resources.

关 键 词：数据安全 政府监管 数字政府 监管机制 数据治理 博弈理论 

分 类 号：F49[经济管理—产业经济] F224.32[文化科学] G301