交易所问询与业绩承诺实现:风险警示还是有效监管?  

Stock Exchange Inquiries and Performance Commitment:Risk Warning or Effective Supervision?

作　　者：周绍妮[1] 周之恬 杜其岳 王中超 ZHOU Shaoni;ZHOU Zhitian;DU Qiyue;WANG Zhongchao(School of Economics and Management,Beijing Jiaotong University,Beijing 100044,China;School of Economics and Management,Beijing Forestry University,Beijing 100083,China)

机构地区：[1]北京交通大学经济管理学院,北京100044 [2]北京林业大学经济管理学院,北京100083

出　　处：《审计与经济研究》2025年第1期73-83,共11页Journal of Audit & Economics

基　　金：中央高校基本科研业务费项目(2023YJS164);国家自然科学基金面上项目(72372007)。

摘　　要：基于2014-2022年业绩承诺实现情况与交易所问询相匹配的数据,探究交易所问询对并购业绩承诺的监管效果,发现交易所针对并购业绩承诺的问询虽然暂未实现有效监管,但针对前期业绩承诺事件的问询能对本次业绩承诺产生跨期风险警示作用。进一步地,外部市场能够接收到交易所问询函的风险警示信号,前期业绩承诺被问询的次数越多,外部市场对本次并购事件首次公告的反应越消极。此外,董事高管责任保险的引入、高声誉财务顾问的聘用和监管政策的强化能够与交易所问询函形成合力,从而实现对业绩承诺的有效监管,表现为提升本次业绩承诺完成率和降低本次业绩承诺期后变脸的可能性。Based on the matched data of performance commitment fulfillment and stock exchange inquiries from 2014 to 2022,this study examines the regulatory effectiveness of stock exchange inquiries on M&A performance commitments.The findings reveal that while the stock exchange's inquiries on M&A performance commitments have not yet achieved effective supervision,inquiries into previous performance commitment events can still serve as an intertemporal risk warning for current performance commitments.Furthermore,external markets can receive risk warning signals from stock exchange inquiry letters,with a more negative market reaction to the first announcement date of current M&A events when there are more inquiries about previous performance commitments.Additionally,the introduction of directors'and officers'liability insurance,engagement of high-reputation financial advisors,and strengthening of regulatory policies can work in synergy with stock exchange inquiry letters to achieve effective supervision of performance commitments,as evidenced by improved completion rates of current performance commitments and reduced likelihood of performance deterioration after the commitment period.

关 键 词：交易所问询函 业绩承诺 风险警示 有效监管 委托代理冲突 信息不对称 声誉约束 威慑效应 

分 类 号：F832.51[经济管理—金融学]