平台掠夺性定价的动机与福利效应  

The Motivation and Welfare Effect of Platform Predatory Pricing

作　　者：于左[1,2] 张二鹏 Yu Zuo;Zhang Erpeng(Center for Industrial Organization and Business Organization,Dongbei University of Finance and Economics,Dalian 116025,China;Institute for Digital Economic Research,Dongbei University of Finance and Economics,Dalian 116025,China)

机构地区：[1]东北财经大学产业组织与企业组织研究中心,辽宁大连116025 [2]东北财经大学数字经济研究院,辽宁大连116025

出　　处：《财经研究》2024年第12期137-151,共15页Journal of Finance and Economics

基　　金：“兴辽英才计划”文化名家暨“四个一批”领军人才项目(XLYC2210001)

摘　　要：平台技术经济特征对传统掠夺性定价理论提出了挑战,平台掠夺性定价的认定值得深入探讨。文章以社区团购平台为例,在分析现实案例特征事实基础上,构建包括低价排他和高价补偿的两阶段横向差异化模型,分析了竞争平台间质量差异、成本差异对掠夺性定价动机和社会福利的影响及其作用机制,探讨了平台掠夺性定价认定规则和反垄断政策。研究结果表明:平台实施掠夺性定价的临界值随着其质量优势的增加而增大,随着其质量劣势的增加而减小;实施掠夺性定价平台的绝对效率和相对效率优势对掠夺性定价动机会产生正向影响;平台掠夺性定价造成的消费者福利损失随着其自身绝对效率的增加而增大,也会随着平台间相对效率绝对值的增加而增大;平台实施掠夺性定价造成的社会总福利损失随着其相对效率劣势的增加而增大,而随着其相对效率优势的增加而减小;当实施掠夺性定价平台具有相对效率劣势且绝对效率较高时,掠夺性定价会造成消费者福利损失和社会总福利损失。文章的研究结论为平台掠夺性定价的认定和反垄断执法提供了参考。In the digital economy,there have been many cases where platforms have squeezed out competitors from the market through low-price competition in the form of subsidies.Whether this low-price competition behavior harms market competition is controversial.Generally speaking,only when enterprises with market dominance squeeze out competitors from the market through low-price behavior can it constitute predatory pricing prohibited by the Antitrust Law.However,platform technical and economic characteristics and quality differences between competing platforms have challenged the traditional theory of predatory pricing.The impact of low-pricing strategies implemented by platforms on market competition and social welfare,as well as the conditions under which such practices constitute predatory pricing,merits thorough investigation.This paper takes community group buying platforms as an example,and based on the analysis of the characteristics of real cases,constructs a two-stage horizontal differentiation model that includes low-price exclusion and high-price compensation.It examines the impact of quality and cost differences between competing platforms on the motivation for predatory pricing and social welfare,as well as the related mechanisms,and discusses the identification rules for platform predatory pricing and antitrust policies.The study shows that:(1)The critical value for platforms to implement predatory pricing increases with the increase of the quality advantage of the platform implementing predatory pricing,and decreases with the increase of the quality disadvantage.(2)The absolute and relative efficiency advantages of the platform implementing predatory pricing have a positive impact on the motivation for predatory pricing.(3)When the platform implementing predatory pricing has a relative efficiency disadvantage but a high absolute efficiency,predatory pricing will cause a loss of consumer welfare and social welfare,and this loss increases with the increase of the relative efficiency disadvantage.(4)Consumer

关 键 词：平台掠夺性定价 质量差异 绝对效率 相对效率 反垄断政策 

分 类 号：F062.9[经济管理—政治经济学]