完善企业年金制度——设计理念与系统优化  

Discussions on the Enterprise Annuity System Improvement--Design Concept and System Optimization

作　　者：高庆波[1] GAO Qing-bo(Chinese Academy of Social Sciences)

机构地区：[1]中国社会科学院中国式现代化研究院

出　　处：《华中科技大学学报(社会科学版)》2025年第1期23-33,共11页Journal of Huazhong University of Science and Technology(Social Science Edition)

基　　金：研究阐释党的二十大精神国家社会科学基金重大项目“2035年我国多层次多支柱养老保险体系发展目标和现实路径研究”(23ZDA100)。

摘　　要：二十年来,中国企业年金制度虽取得了一定成绩,但仍面临着多重挑战。从养老保险制度设计的层面来看,企业年金制度突出表现为覆盖范围狭小、逆向收入再分配且发展动力不足。分析发现,我国企业年金制度激励效应生效至少需具备以下两个条件之一:一是企业拥有大量高薪雇员,二是企业工资总额不能自主决策。激励效应的生效条件也是导致既有企业年金制度覆盖范围有限,进而导致缺乏发展动力的根源所在。在既有制度日益受到劳动市场结构变迁冲击的情况下,建议企业年金制度的设计理念在注重古典决策理论的基础上向行为转化,从养老保险系统的角度出发,实现多层次、多支柱间的协同发展。Over the past twenty years,although China’s enterprise annuity system has achieved certain results,it still faces multiple challenges.From the perspective of the design of the pension insurance system,the prominent manifestations are limited coverage,reverse income redistribution,and insufficient development momentum.Analysis has found that the effective incentive effect of China’s enterprise annuity system requires at least one of the following two conditions:first,the enterprise has a large number of high paying employees;Secondly,the total salary of the enterprise cannot be independently determined.The effective conditions for the incentive effect are also the root cause of the limited coverage of the existing enterprise pension system,which leads to a lack of development momentum.In the context of the increasing impact of changes in the labor market structure on existing systems,it is recommended that the design concept of the enterprise pension system shift from focusing on classical decision-making theory to behavior,and from the perspective of the pension insurance system,achieve coordinated development among multiple levels and pillars.

关 键 词：企业年金 行为经济学 自动加入 制度变迁 养老保险 

分 类 号：F840.612[经济管理—保险]