考虑环境责任分担的供应链绿色设计决策及协调  

Green Design Decision and Coordination of Supply Chain Considering Environmental Responsibility Sharing

作　　者：姚锋敏 闫颍洛 张晓莉 李玥 YAO Fengmin;YAN Yingluo;ZHANG Xiaoli;LI Yue(Harbin University of Science and Technology,Harbin,China)

机构地区：[1]哈尔滨理工大学经济与管理学院,哈尔滨市150080

出　　处：《管理学报》2025年第1期156-166,共11页Chinese Journal of Management

基　　金：黑龙江省哲学社会科学研究规划资助项目(21GLB065);中央支持地方高校改革发展资金人才培养项目(2021);国家自然科学基金资助项目(72174045)。

摘　　要：基于两种环境责任分担决策模式(零售商决策、合作决策),构建3种渠道权力结构下制造商与零售商联合分担环境责任的供应链博弈模型,分析渠道权力和环境责任成本分担对供应链运作协调以及环境的影响。研究发现,零售商分担部分环境责任成本能激励制造商提高绿色设计水平,改善自身及供应链整体绩效,但并不总是有利于增加制造商利润;较之零售商主导与合作决策模式,制造商主导与Nash均衡博弈下,零售商决策模式的最佳环境责任成本分担比例始终更低,且受绿色设计相关参数的影响;无论在何种渠道权力结构下,均可通过固定补偿费用契约实现不同环境责任分担模式供应链的协调。Based on two decision-making modes(retailer decision and cooperative decision)of environmental responsibility sharing,the supply chain game models of manufacturer and retailer jointly sharing environmental responsibility under three channel power structures are constructed.The influence of channel power and environmental responsibility cost sharing on supply chain operation coordination and environment is analyzed.The study shows that the retailer sharing a part of environmental responsibility costs is conducive to encouraging the manufacturer to improve green design level and the performance of itself and overall supply chain,but it is not always conducive to increasing the manufacturer’s profit.Moreover,compared to the retailer-leading and cooperative decision-making modes,under the manufacturer-leading mode and Nash equilibrium game,the optimal environmental responsibility cost sharing of the retailer decision-making mode is always lower and affected by the parameters related to green design.Regardless of the channel power structure,supply chain coordination of different environmental responsibility sharing modes can be achieved through fixed compensation fee contracts.

关 键 词：供应链 环境责任分担 绿色设计 渠道权力结构 固定补偿费用 

分 类 号：C93[经济管理—管理学]