产出不确定环境下考虑政府补贴的低碳供应链博弈模型与契约设计  

Low-Carbon Supply Chain Game Model and Contract Design Considering Government Subsidy under Yield Uncertainty

作　　者：蔡建湖 颜玲 李雨婷 方刚[1] CAI Jianhu;YAN Ling;LI Yuting;FANG Gang(Hangzhou Dianzi University,Hangzhou,China;Zhejiang University of Technology,Hangzhou,China)

机构地区：[1]杭州电子科技大学管理学院,杭州市310018 [2]浙江工业大学管理学院

出　　处：《管理学报》2025年第1期167-177,共11页Chinese Journal of Management

基　　金：浙江省哲学社会科学规划专项课题资助项目;国家自然科学基金资助项目(71972171,72272047)。

摘　　要：为探究产出不确定和政府补贴下低碳供应链运作性能的提升方案,构建由一个产出不确定的制造商和一个零售商组成的两级低碳供应链博弈模型,其中制造商的碳减排行为会受到政府补贴的支持。基于对低碳供应链成员在基本情形、成本共担契约情形和期权契约情形下均衡解与均衡利润的求解及比较,发现成本共担契约和期权契约都能在一定条件下实现供应链性能的帕累托改进。数值分析进一步显示,当政府补贴系数和消费者低碳偏好系数值处于不同的区间时,供应链成员对期权契约和成本共担契约的偏好也会有差异。To explore the improvement scheme for a low-carbon supply chain’s operation performance under yield uncertainty and government subsidy,a game model consisting of one manufacturer with yield uncertainty and one retailer is constructed,where the manufacturer’s carbon emission reduction level is subsidized by the government.Based on comparison analysis of the low-carbon supply chain members’equilibrium decisions and expected profits in the cases of decentralization,cost-sharing contract,and option contract,it is found that both cost-sharing contract and option contract can realize the Pareto improvement of the low-carbon supply chain under certain conditions.The numerical analysis further shows that,when the government subsidy coefficient and consumers’low-carbon preference coefficient locate in different intervals,the low-carbon supply chain members’preferences for the option contract and cost-sharing contract may be different.

关 键 词：低碳供应链 低碳偏好 政府补贴 产出不确定 供应链契约 

分 类 号：C93[经济管理—管理学]