演化博弈视角下的偷盗气现象分析  

Analysis of Stealing Gas Action under the Evolutionary Game

作　　者：米成 刘广顺 MI Cheng;LIU Guangshun

机构地区：[1]西安华润燃气有限公司

出　　处：《上海煤气》2025年第1期28-31,共4页Shanghai Gas

摘　　要：偷盗气现象不仅严重影响燃气公司的经济效益,更是安全生产的重大隐患。根据燃气用户与燃气公司的收益矩阵,建立演化博弈模型,通过分析平衡点稳定性,探究两者之间的联系并提出治理举措。演化博弈分析表明:主体双方不存在均衡稳定点,系统围绕某一中心点震荡博弈;对中心点的敏感度要素分析得出,通过第三方管控燃气用户与燃气公司之间的经济问题,以及燃气公司借助新技术降低监管成本,可较好地治理偷盗气现象,提升城镇燃气安全管理环境。The action of stealing gas not only seriously affects the economic benefits of gas companies,but also poses a hidden danger to safety production.According to the income matrix of gas users and gas companies,an evolutionary game model is established,and the relationship between the two is explored by analyzing the stability of the equilibrium point,and the management measures are proposed.The analysis of evolutionary game shows that there is no stable equilibrium point between the two players,and the system oscillates around a central point.Based on the analysis of the sensitivity factors,it is concluded that the economic problems between gas users and gas companies can be controlled by the third party,and the gas companies can reduce the supervision cost with the help of new technologies,which can better control the action of stealing gas and improve the urban gas safety management environment.

关 键 词：城镇燃气 演化博弈 偷盗气现象 安全管理 

分 类 号：F299.24[经济管理—国民经济] TU996[建筑科学—供热、供燃气、通风及空调工程]