非常规突发事件下供应链企业协同管理——基于政府参与的三方演化博弈  

Cooperative Management of Supply Chain Enterprises under Unconventional Emergencies:A Three-party Evolutionary Game Based on Government Participation

作　　者：邵舒羽 SHAO Shuyu(Beijing Wuzi University,Beijing 101149)

机构地区：[1]北京物资学院,北京101149

出　　处：《物流技术》2025年第2期61-72,共12页Logistics Technology

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(82102176);北京市社会科学基金青年项目(21GLC040);北京市教委科技计划青年项目(KM202210037001)。

摘　　要：在非常规突发事件下,如何通过供应链企业协同管理来提高供应链的灵活性和服务质量是一个亟待解决的问题。基于多主体关系分析、演化博弈论和情景模拟仿真方法,构建了政府、企业、公众的两方与三方演化博弈模型,综合探究各方在供应链协同管理中的策略选择及系统演化轨迹。研究发现:在两方演化博弈模型中,政府参与供应链协同的决策受到社会责任与财政均衡的双重制约,而企业则主要基于成本与收益的权衡进行决策。公众参与对企业的协同决策具有显著影响,成为推动供应链协同的重要驱动力。在三方演化博弈模型中,公众和政府的演化路径与两方演化博弈模型一致,但企业需要同时考虑公众关注和公众监督对其演化路径选择的影响。情景模拟仿真结果表明,政府对供应链协同的技术资金补贴和税费优惠政策的支持力度加大,以及公众关注度增强,均能显著促进企业选择供应链协同。同时,政府监督收取违规税费和公众监督影响社会舆论,有时会对企业在非常规突发事件下的供应链协同起到规范和反向激励作用。该研究为优化非常规突发事件下供应链协同管理提供了理论框架与实践路径,为政府政策制定、企业协同策略优化以及公众参与机制设计提供了有益参考。It is an urgent issue to be addressed how the flexibility and service quality of supply chain under un-conventional emergencies can be improved through collaborative management of supply chain enterprises.This pa-per,based on multi-agent relationship analysis,evolutionary game theory and scenario simulation method,constructs a two-party game model of the government and enterprises,enterprises and the public,and a three-party game mod-el of the government,enterprises and the public to comprehensively explore the strategic selection and systemic evo-lutionary trajectory of the government,the supply chain enterprises and the public in supply chain collaborative man-agement.The results show that under the two-party evolutionary game model,the government's decision to partici-pate in supply chain collaboration is constrained by both social responsibility and financial equilibrium,while enter-prises mainly make decisions based on a cost-benefit analysis.In addition,the public involvement in supply chain collaboration is an important factor affecting enterprises'supply chain collaboration.On the other hand,under the three-party evolutionary game model,the evolutionary path of the public and the government are consistent with that of the two parties,but enterprises need to consider the impact of public participation and public supervision on their choice of the evolutionary path.Moreover,scenario simulation results show that increased government's support through technical funds,financial subsidies and tax incentives,as well as heightened public attention,can signifi-cantly promote enterprise'choice of supply chain collaboration.Even the government's supervision on illegal taxes and fees and public supervision influencing public opinion sometimes play a normative and reverse incentive effect on the supply chain collaboration under unconventional emergencies.In summary,this study provides a theoretical framework and practical pathway for optimizing supply chain collaboration under unconventional emergencies and of-fers va

关 键 词：非常规突发事件 供应链 多主体 协同管理 三方演化博弈 

分 类 号：F224.32[经济管理—国民经济] F259.23[政治法律—政治学] D035