Charging Pricing for Autonomous Mobility-on-demand Fleets Based on Game Theory  

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作  者:Jiawei Wang Yujie Sheng Huaichang Ge Xiang Bai Jia Su Qinglai Guo Hongbin Sun 

机构地区:[1]Department of Electrical Engineering,Tsinghua University,Beijing 100084,China [2]Shanxi Energy Internet Research Institute,Taiyuan 030032,China

出  处:《Journal of Modern Power Systems and Clean Energy》2024年第6期2006-2018,共13页现代电力系统与清洁能源学报(英文)

基  金:This work was supported by Shanxi Energy Internet Research Institute(No.SXEI2023A 003).

摘  要:Considering the enormous potential application of autonomous mobility-on-demand(AMoD)systems in future ur-ban transportation,the charging behavior of AMoD fleets,as a key link connecting the power system and the transportation system,needs to be guided by a reasonable charging demand management method.This paper uses game theory to investi-gate charging pricing methods for the AMoD fleets.Firstly,an AMoD fleet scheduling model with appropriate scale and mathe-matical complexity is established to describe the spatio-tempo-ral action patterns of the AMoD fleet.Subsequently,using Stackelberg game and Nash bargaining,two game frameworks,i.e.,non-cooperative and cooperative,are designed for the charging station operator(CSO)and the AMoD fleet.Then,the interaction trends between the two entities and the mechanism of charging price formation are discussed,along with an analy-sis of the game implications for breaking the non-cooperative di-lemma and moving towards cooperation.Finally,numerical ex-periments based on real-world city-scale data are provided to validate the designed game frameworks.The results show that the spatio-temporal distribution of charging prices can be cap-tured and utilized by the AMoD fleet.The CSO can then use this action pattern to determine charging prices to optimize the profit.Based on this,negotiated bargaining improves the over-all benefits for stakeholders in urban transportation.

关 键 词:Charging pricing autonomous mobility-on-demand Stackelberg game Nash bargaining 

分 类 号:TM73[电气工程—电力系统及自动化] O225[理学—运筹学与控制论]

 

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