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作 者:喻颖倩 何川[1] 刘天琪[1] 张瑜祺 张敏 王腾鑫 YU Yingqian;HE Chuan;LIU Tianqi;ZHANG Yuqi;ZHANG Min;WANG Tengxin(College of Electrical Engineering,Sichuan University,Chengdu 610065,Sichuan Province,China;Electric Power Research Institute of State Grid Shanxi Electric Power Company,Taiyuan 030001,Shanxi Province,China)
机构地区:[1]四川大学电气工程学院,四川省成都市610065 [2]国网山西省电力公司电力科学研究院,山西省太原市030001
出 处:《中国电机工程学报》2025年第4期1450-1464,I0018,共16页PROCEEDINGS OF THE CHINESE SOCIETY FOR ELECTRICAL ENGINEERING
基 金:国家电网公司科技项目(5100-202199274A-0-0-00)。
摘 要:针对当前大规模储能定价与运营模式单一、交易机制不明确、利用率低等问题,计及储能调频、寿命损耗,提出一种基于主从博弈的多套餐共享储能分布鲁棒定价方法。首先,设计了按租赁容量、充放电量、使用时段支付的3种储能服务套餐,并建立确定性的独立发电商与共享储能服务商的主从博弈模型,模型上层计及储能寿命损耗成本、套餐服务费、日前调频市场收益以及储能向电网的峰谷套利,以共享储能服务商盈利最大为目标函数,模型下层考虑风火打捆、上网偏差惩罚、发电收益与储能套餐服务费,以独立发电商的收益最大为目标函数。其次,考虑风电不确定性,建立独立发电商的分布鲁棒优化模型并代入所提的主从博弈定价模型。最后,算例结果表明,合理的定价机制与合适的储能服务套餐有助于风电场减少弃风、跟踪计划出力、应对风电出力的不确定性,实现博弈双方互利共赢。Aiming at the problems of single pricing and operation mode,unclear trading mechanism,and low utilization rate of large-scale energy storage,this paper proposed a robust pricing method of multi-package shared energy storage distribution based on master-slave game.First,three kinds of energy storage service packages are designed according to lease capacity,charge,and discharge amount,and service time,and a deterministic master-slave game model between independent power producers and shared energy storage service providers is established.The upper layer of the model takes into account the energy storage life loss cost,package service fee,day-to-day FM market income,and peak-valley arbitrage of energy storage to the power grid and takes the maximum profit of shared energy storage service providers as the objective function.The lower layer of the model,considering wind-fire bundling,online deviation penalty,power generation income,and energy storage package service fee,takes the maximum profit of independent power producers as the objective function.Second,considering the uncertainty of wind power,a distributed robust optimization model of independent power producers is established and substituted into the master-slave game pricing model in this paper.Finally,the results of an example show that reasonable pricing mechanisms and appropriate energy storage service packages are helpful for wind farms to reduce wind abandonment,track planned output,cope with the uncertainty of wind power output,and achieve mutual benefit and win-win for both parties in the game.
关 键 词:共享储能 储能寿命损耗 多套餐定价 主从博弈 风火打捆 分布鲁棒优化
分 类 号:TM73[电气工程—电力系统及自动化] F426.61[经济管理—产业经济]
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