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作 者:李想[1,2] 聂发鹏 张艺 LI Xiang;NIE Fa-peng;ZHANG Yi(College of Economics and Management,Beijing University of Chemical Technology,Beijing 100029,China;School of Management,Beijing Institute of Technology,Beijing 100081,China;School of Management,Northwestern Polytechnical University,Xi’an 710072,China;School of Mathematics,Renmin University of China,Beijing 100872,China)
机构地区:[1]北京化工大学经济与管理学院,北京100029 [2]北京理工大学管理学院,北京100081 [3]西北工业大学管理学院,西安710072 [4]中国人民大学数学学院,北京100872
出 处:《管理科学学报》2025年第1期17-28,共12页Journal of Management Sciences in China
基 金:国家自然科学基金资助项目(71931001,72201022);中国博士后科学基金项目(2021M690317);中央校基本科研业务费专项资金(ZY2114);北京化工大学一流学科建设专项资金(XK1802-5)资助。
摘 要:近年来,巡游车市场份额遭到网约车的蚕食,并存在被赶出出租车市场的风险.为了应对风险,促进巡游车与网约车融合发展,调整巡游车价格是一种有效手段.本研究考虑了网约车竞争和长短途乘客出行成本的差异,基于概率选择模型分析两类乘客的出行选择行为,构建Stackelberg博弈模型分析竞争环境下的巡游车定价问题,探索出租车市场的均衡状态.研究发现:1)当巡游车起步价和单位里程价都相对较低时,巡游车和网约车可融合发展;2)为了避免被赶出市场,巡游车应设置较低的起步价和单位里程价,形成短途竞争、长途竞争的均衡市场状态;3)在均衡市场中,乘客偏好增加会使网约车和巡游车收益提高.进一步,当乘客偏好较高时,增加乘客偏好能提高乘客剩余.In recent years,the market share of cruising taxi has been gradually eroded by ride-hailing serv-ices,which posesa risk that cruising taxi services may be driven out of the taxi market.To cope with the risk and promote the integration of cruising taxis and ride-hailing,adjusting the price of cruising taxis is an effec-tive way.Considering the competition from ride-hailing and the difference in the travel cost of long-and short-distance passengers,this paper analyzes the travel choice behavior of these two types of passengers based on the probability selection model.It then builds a Stackelberg game model to analyze the cruising taxi pricing problem in a competitive environment and derives the equilibrium state of the taxi market.The results show that:1)when the flat fee per ride and unit mileage fare of the cruising taxi are relatively low,the development of cruising taxi and the ride-hailing can be integrated;2)In order to avoid being driven out of the market,the cruising taxi service should set a lower flat fee and unit mileage fare so that the cruising taxi service and the ride-hailing service can reach equilibrium for both short and long-distance competition;3)In the equilibrium market,an increase in passenger preference leads to higher revenue for both ride-hailing and cruising taxi services.Furthermore,when passenger preference reaches a higher level,enhancing the passenger preference leads to a higher passenger surplus.
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