基于收益共享契约的供应商入侵策略分析  

Supplier encroachment strategies based on revenue sharing contract

作　　者：黄佳舟 吴瑶斌 陈祥锋[3] HUANG Jia-zhou;WU Yao-bin;CHEN Xiang-feng(School of Finance,Nanjing Audit University,Nanjing 211815,China;School of Management,Shanghai University,Shanghai 200444,China;School of Management,Fudan University,Shanghai 200433,China)

机构地区：[1]南京审计大学金融学院,南京211815 [2]上海大学管理学院,上海200444 [3]复旦大学管理学院,上海200433

出　　处：《管理科学学报》2025年第1期29-41,共13页Journal of Management Sciences in China

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(72232002,71872051,72401176);江苏省高等学校自然科学研究项目资助(24KJB630012)。

摘　　要：在由单一供应商和单一零售商组成的供应链中,本研究分析了收益共享契约对供应商入侵策略的影响,并研究了供应链企业对供应商入侵的偏好条件.结果表明对零售商而言,较高的收益共享比例会提高自身的服务努力水平,从而扩大产品的市场供给量,增加消费者剩余,并使得供应商入侵有利于自身利润提升;对供应商而言,只有当零售商服务努力的成本系数较高时,供应商入侵能使自身受益,此时零售商和供应商均存在最优的收益共享比例,且最优的收益共享比例随零售商服务努力的成本系数增大而减小.本研究还从产品竞争、直销运营成本、数量决策顺序三个方面验证了主要结论的稳定性.研究结论丰富了现有渠道管理的理论成果,为供应链企业多渠道销售提供参考和借鉴.This paper studies the impact of revenue-sharing contracts on firms'preferences regarding supplier encroachment in a stylized supply chain including a supplier and a retailer.The results show that,for the re-tailer,a higher proportion of revenue sharing leads to higher service effort,higher market demand,and higher consumer surplus.The retailer benefits from supplier encroachment when the proportion of the revenue sharing is high.For the supplier,the supplier encroachment can benefit itself only when the coefficient of the retailer's service effort cost is high.Meanwhile,there exists an optimal proportion of revenue sharing that maximizes the supplier or retailer's profit under the supplier encroachment strategy,and that the optimal proportion of reve-nue sharing decreases with the coefficient of the retailer's service effort cost.Furthermore,the paper extends the analysis to investigate the impacts of the channel competition,the cost of the direct selling and the se-quence of quantity decisions,on supplier encroachment strategies,and shows our main results are robust.These results enrich the existing literature and provide managerial insights of dual-channel management for supply chain firms.

关 键 词：供应商入侵 收益共享 渠道竞争 直销 

分 类 号：C934[经济管理—管理学]