工业控制系统的物理入侵威胁模型与防护方法  

Physical Intrusion Attack and Countermeasures in Industrial Control Systems

作　　者：王相茗 鹏飞 刘杨[1] 刘烃[1] 

机构地区：[1]西安交通大学 [2]西安热工院

出　　处：《自动化博览》2025年第1期29-33,共5页Automation Panorama

摘　　要：随着工业控制系统数字化和智能化转型的推进,信息网络技术与物理控制系统传统业务之间的融合日益加深。在各类业务频繁交互的背景下,海量传感器及执行器设备泛在接入,系统边界网络呈现出分布广泛、无人值守、物理保护措施薄弱的特点,为攻击者提供了以非授权接入设备为侵入方式的物理入侵攻击途径。攻击者可利用静默性入侵设备长期潜伏在系统中实施信息窃取,对工业控制系统造成极大的安全威胁。本文通过分析工业控制系统安全威胁案例和演变趋势,提出了物理入侵攻击威胁及其模型,对比了物理入侵设备的检测方法,探讨了该领域面临的挑战难题和未来的研究方向。The integration of industrial control systems(ICS)with the internet has significantly advanced the intelligence and informatization of these systems.Under the backdrop of frequent cross-domain interactions among various operations,a large number of sensors and actuator devices are widely connected,leading to system boundary networks that exhibit characteristics such as wide distribution,unattended operation,and weak physical protection,providing attackers with a physical intrusion attack path using unauthorized intrusion devices.Attackers can use the silent intrusion device to remain hidden in the system for long periods and steal information,posing a great security threat to ICSs.This paper analyzes security threat cases and their evolutionary trends in ICSs,proposes the threat of physical intrusion attack and its corresponding models,compares detection methods for physical intrusion devices,and discusses the challenges and future research directions in this field.

关 键 词：工业控制系统 现场总线网络 物理入侵攻击 信道状态指纹 

分 类 号：TP273[自动化与计算机技术—检测技术与自动化装置] TP393.08[自动化与计算机技术—控制科学与工程]