基于不确定损失、管理者声誉以及纯利他的邻避补偿机制研究  

Exploring the compensation mechanism addressing NIMBYism: Uncertain losses, administrator reputation, and pure altruism

作　　者：余刘凯 郑君君[1] 夏正伟 YU Liukai;ZHENG Junjun;XIA Zhengwei(School of Economics and Management,Wuhan University,Wuhan 430072,China;Asia-Pacific Logistics Institute,National University of Singapore,Singapore 117579,Singapore;School of Information Management,Wuhan University,Wuhan 430072,China;Information Center,Wuhan University,Wuhan 430072,China)

机构地区：[1]武汉大学经济与管理学院,武汉430072 [2]新加坡国立大学亚太物流研究所,新加坡117579 [3]武汉大学信息管理学院,武汉430072 [4]武汉大学信息中心,武汉430072

出　　处：《系统工程理论与实践》2025年第1期144-159,共16页Systems Engineering-Theory & Practice

基　　金：国家自然科学基金面上项目(72171180);国家自然科学基金重点项目(72031009);国家社会科学基金重大项目(20&ZD058)。

摘　　要：有效应对邻避效应是新时代社会治理与民主制度建设的紧迫议题,补偿作为消除负外部性与调节利益失衡的有效手段,是邻避治理的重要政策工具.本文考虑居民心理损失的不确定性与管理者声誉波动,提出基于利益共享机制的邻避补偿策略.通过刻画不确定损失对管理者决策的影响,本文引入声誉波动函数,构建双层规划模型探究最优利益共享机制.结论强调了利益共享机制与不同类型邻避设施的适配性,共享总正外部性实现的补偿方式能有效促使管理者的决策兼顾社会整体利益与周边居民利益;同时,分析揭示了利益共享机制将引发管理者声誉提升与总补偿额提高、激励效果提升之间的冲突,当面对高正外部性效应设施与极端心理损失居民时,管理者对高声誉的追求是不明智的;此外,纯利他心理的引入能有效解决利益共享机制面对低正外部性效应设施时的低效激励问题,缓解甚至消除了声誉与总补偿额提升之间的冲突,并放松了对管理者的高声誉目标要求.分析结论可从邻避补偿机制设计、管理者声誉管理以及纯利他心理引导三方面为应对邻避效应提供建议.Effectively addressing'Not in My Backyard'(NIMBY)conflict is an urgent issue in the new era of social governance and democratic institution-building.Compensation,as an effective measure to mitigate negative externalities and regulate interest imbalance,serves as an important policy tool for NIMBY governance.This paper proposes a benefit-sharing mechanism as compensation strategy considering residents'uncertain psychology losses and the administrator's reputation fluctuation.By depicting the impact of uncertain losses on the administrator's decision-making,we introduce the reputation fluctuation function,and construct a bi-level programming model to explore the optimal benefit-sharing mechanism.The result emphasizes the adaptability of the proposed mechanism to divergent types of NIMBY facilities.Sharing total positive externalities as compensation can effectively constrain administrator's decision to balance societal and local residents'interests.Meanwhile,the analyses reveal that the public benefit-sharing mechanism will induce trade-offs between reputation improvement and incentive effects enhancement,as well as the total compensation addition.It indicates that pursuing high reputation target is unwise when facing facilities with high positive externalities and residents with extreme psychological losses.Moreover,introducing pure altruism can effectively address the inefficient incentive problem of the benefit-sharing mechanism when dealing with facilities with low positive externality effect.It alleviates and even eliminates the conflict between reputation elevation and the total compensation addition.It also relaxes the requirement for the administrator to pursue high reputation target.The analyses can provide suggestions for addressing NIMBY syndrome from compensation policy design,reputation management,and pure altruism introduction.

关 键 词：邻避效应 利益共享机制 不确定损失 声誉波动 纯利他心理 

分 类 号：C93[经济管理—管理学]