农村集体经营性建设用地入市:地方政府制度创新行为研究  

Rural Collective Commercialized Land Market Entry:Research on Local Governments'Institutional Innovation Behavior

作　　者：马翠萍[1] MA Cuiping(Rural Development Institute,Chinese Academy of Social Sciences)

机构地区：[1]中国社会科学院农村发展研究所

出　　处：《中国农村经济》2025年第2期20-38,共19页Chinese Rural Economy

基　　金：国家社会科学基金一般项目“集体经营性建设用地入市收益分配机制研究”(编号:24BJY173);中国社会科学院智库基础研究项目“农村低效闲置用地再利用政策研究”(编号:ZKJC240804)。

摘　　要：地方政府的创新实践为完善农村集体经营性建设用地制度提供了重要的决策支撑。本文以国家33个农村集体经营性建设用地入市试点县(市、区)为研究对象,在归纳总结地方政府有关土地入市制度创新实践的基础上,从激励约束视角探讨地方政府制度创新的行为逻辑。研究发现:地方政府在中央政府顶层制度框架内,通过因地制宜扩展土地入市范围、创新土地入市模式、扩大土地入市用途、探索入市土地增值收益分配方式等举措,积极响应中央政府有关农村集体经营性建设用地入市的决策部署;制度创新是地方政府对中央政府激励机制作出的能动响应,其动力既源于对制度变动多元目标的追求,如提高土地资源配置效率、降低产权交易成本、促进区域平衡发展,也源于地方政府期望获得政治荣誉及晋升。进一步分析表明:中央政府在构建顶层制度框架的同时,也为地方政府制度创新预留了空间;地方政府具有制度创新的主观能动性,但制度创新的空间要视顶层制度的可变通余地而定;地方政府更倾向于采取边际调整的方式拓展既有制度边界。据此,完善农村集体经营性建设用地入市制度应推动国家顶层制度设计同基层探索有机结合,在国家层面尽快配套出台农村集体经营性建设用地入市具体指导意见或办法;加快地方各级国土空间规划审批和实施,防范随意调整规划和借规划调整改变耕地用途;强化农村土地改革的系统性和协同性,激发土地要素活力。The innovative practices of local governments have provided important decision-making support for the improvement of the system of rural collectively commercialized land.This paper takes China's 33 county-level areas that have been chosen as pilots to build the collective commercialized land market as the research object.Based on summarizing the innovative practices of local governments about the rural collective commercialized land market,this paper discusses the behavioral logic of local govermments'institutional innovation from the perspective of the incentive constraints theory.This paper finds that local govermments actively respond to the central government's deployment,such as expanding the scope of land entering the market according to local conditions,innovating the land transaction mode,expanding the commercialized use of land,and exploring the distribution of value-added gains from the rural collective commercialized land market.Of course,these initiatives follow the top-level institutional design of the central government.Theoretical analysis suggests that institutional innovation is a dynamic response of local govermments to central govermment incentives.Local governments'institutional innovation is driven by the pursuit of multiple profits from institutional change,such as improving the efficiency of land resource allocation,reducing the cost of property rights transactions,and easing social conflicts.It also stems from the expectation of local governments to improve central-local relations and thus gain political honors as well as promotions.Further analysis suggests that while the central govermment builds a top-level institutional framework,it reserves space for local governments'institutional innovation;local governments have the initiative to innovate,but the scope for institutional innovation depends on the variable space of the top-level system;and local goverments are more inclined to take a marginal adjustment approach to extend the boundaries of established systems.This study highlights th

关 键 词：农村集体经营性建设用地 土地制度改革 地方政府 制度创新 

分 类 号：F301.11[经济管理—产业经济]