论中国行政裁量基准逸脱适用的法治化规制路径  

The Path for Regulating Escape of Administrative Discretionary Benchmark in China

作　　者：李幸洁 LI Xingjie(School of Law,Fudan University,Shanghai 200438,China)

机构地区：[1]复旦大学法学院,上海200438

出　　处：《北京理工大学学报(社会科学版)》2025年第2期125-135,共11页Journal of Beijing Institute of Technology:Social Sciences Edition

基　　金：司法部重点课题“中国合宪性审查权力的功能定位与合理配置研究”(19SFB1003)。

摘　　要：行政裁量基准制度的内在张力导致逸脱现象难以避免,还产生逸脱失当和逸脱怠惰等衍生问题。立法、行政和司法三条路径构成的逸脱规制机制分别存在规制面向单一、逸脱条款虚置、司法审查方式不一的问题,实际规制效果一般。其根本原因在于,裁量基准自身的性质定位决定其无法严格适用,与行政-司法规制机制推崇严格适用的取向之间存在衔接不畅和功能错位。解决方案是构建自我规制与外部过程规制的二阶治理框架,对裁量基准内置的逸脱条款进行规范构造(自我规制),同时通过构建“过程控制”的行政责任体制和过程式司法审查方法理顺行政-司法规制机制(外部过程规制),保证逸脱适用既能作为个别情况下抵达实质正义的正当手段而运用,又不至于脱离法治化和规范化轨道。Reasonably escaping from the administrative discretionary benchmark can help achieve the discretionary effect of appropriate punishment in individual cases,but the derivative problems of improper escape and escape laziness highlight the need to establish a mechanism for escape regulation.From a practical perspective,the escape regulation mechanism consisting of legislative,administrative,and judicial approaches is unable to deal with the problems of improper escape and escape laziness.The fundamental reason lies in the poor connection and functional dislocation between the nature of the discretion benchmark itself and the administrative-judicial regulation mechanism.Standardizing the construction of the escape clause built into the discretionary benchmark,optimizing the administrative-judicial regulation mechanism through the construction of an“process control”administrative responsibility system and a“three-stage”judicial review method,can help ensure that the application of escape can be used as a legitimate means to achieve substantive justice in individual cases without deviating from the path of rule of law and standardization.

关 键 词：裁量基准 行政裁量 逸脱适用 个案正义 

分 类 号：DF813[政治法律—法学]