借程序谋利的实践机理及其法律规制——基于程序成本视角的考察  

The Practical Mechanism and Legal Regulation of Using Programs for Profit——An Analysis from the Perspective of Procedure Cost

作　　者：于龙刚[1,2] YU Longgang

机构地区：[1]中南财经政法大学法学院 [2]中南财经政法大学基层法治研究所,湖北武汉430073

出　　处：《思想战线》2025年第1期121-130,共10页Thinking

基　　金：湖北省社会科学基金重点项目暨“法治湖北”专项课题“湖北推进信访工作法治化实现路径研究”阶段性成果(HBSKJJ2024702)。

摘　　要：基层司法、执法、信访等领域中的滥诉、恶意投诉举报、谋利型上访等现象可以概括为借程序谋利。其具体表现为一方当事人通过启动或延长法律程序来迫使对方当事人和相关部门妥协退让,从而获取额外利益。高昂的程序成本增加了对方当事人和相关部门的负担,使其产生了回避程序的心理和行为偏好,这为借程序谋利提供了现实可能。目前虽然有针对此类行为的法律规制体系,但由于实施成本过高,导致规制措施的使用率较低,规制效果不理想。因此,防范和减少此类行为,需要从成本调控的思路出发,一方面降低既有规制措施的成本,提高其使用率,从而改善规制效果;另一方面要压低程序的成本,减轻当事人和相关部门的程序负担,进而重塑其直面程序的心理和行为偏好。In fields like grassroots justice,law enforcement,and petitioning,phenomena like excessive complaints,malicious complaints and reports,and profit-driven petitioning are basically the exploitation of procedures for person gains.Specially,it manifests when one party initiates or prolongs legal procedures to force the other party and relevant departments to compromise,thereby obtaining additional benefits.The high procedural costs increase the burden on the other party and relevant departments and make them have a psychological and behavioral preference to avoid the procedures,thus providing possibilities for exploiting the system.At present,although there are legal regulatory systems addressing such behaviors,the regulatory effect is not ideal due to the high implementation cost.Therefore,measures can be taken to approach the issue from a cost-control perspective.To reshape the psychological and behavioral preferences of the parties involved and relevant departments,on the one hand,the costs of existing regulatory measures should be lowered to improve regulatory effectiveness;on the other hand,the costs of the procedures themselves should be reduced to alleviate the burden on the parties involved and relevant departments.

关 键 词：程序成本 程序回避 法律规制 成本调控 

分 类 号：D90-52[政治法律—法学理论]