基于当量电价的高耗能企业减碳行为演化博弈  

Evolutionary Game of Carbon Reduction Behavior of High Energy-consuming Enterprises Based on Equivalent Electricity Price

作　　者：陈曦 李明翰 田洪莉 代春艳[2] 江天炎 毕茂强 CHEN Xi;LI Minghan;TIAN Hongli;DAI Chunyan;JIANG Tianyan;BI Maoqiang(School of Electrical and Electronic Engineering,Chongqing University of Technology,Chongqing 400054,China;School of management science and engineering,Chongqing Technology and Business University,Chongqing 400067,China)

机构地区：[1]重庆理工大学电气与电子工程学院,重庆400054 [2]重庆工商大学管理科学与工程学院,重庆400067

出　　处：《新型电力系统》2025年第1期100-110,共11页NEW TYPE POWER SYSTEMS

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(52177129);重庆市自然科学基金(CSTB2022NSCQ-MSX0267)。

摘　　要：随着国家“碳达峰碳中和”和“能耗双控”任务的日趋紧迫,考虑电碳联合市场环境下,研究市场模式及价格对效率具有重要意义。该文基于演化博弈理论,引入政府动态奖惩机制,构建了电碳联合市场下的政府与高耗能企业的减碳行为博弈模型,开展了演化稳定性分析,并且为探究电价模式对高耗能企业减碳行为的影响,设计了一种引入有效容量作为容量成本参考系的改进当量电价体系,研究了不同电价模式对企业减碳行为的影响。研究结果表明:在政府动态奖惩机制下,双方存在唯一的演化稳定策略,演化轨迹表现为一条螺旋线;高耗能企业在统一出清电价、两部制电价以及改进当量电价3种电价模式中,改进当量电价模式下的高耗能企业减碳行为概率更大;在改进当量电价有效运行情况下,当减碳总体目标可控时,电价激励可以适时取消。以上研究可为促进高耗能企业节能降碳,优化电力市场可持续运行提供参考。With the escalating urgency of national goals for“peak carbon and carbon neutrality”and“dual control of energy consumption,”it is crucial to study the impact of market prices on the energy-saving and carbon reduction behaviors of energy-intensive enterprises under the electricity-carbon joint market environment.This research,based on evolutionary game theory,incorporates a government dynamic reward and punishment mechanism,constructs a carbon reduction game model between the government and energy-consuming enterprises,and analyzes evolutionary stability.To explore the influence of electricity pricing models on corporate carbon reduction behavior,an improved equivalent electricity pricing system is designed,using effective capacity as a reference for capacity cost.Findings indicate that under the government's dynamic mechanism,a unique evolutionary stable strategy exists,with a spiral evolutionary trajectory.Among various pricing models,the improved equivalent tariff maximizes the probability of carbon reduction behavior in energy-intensive enterprises.When the overall carbon reduction goal is achievable under the improved equivalent tariff,the tariff incentive can be phased out.This study provides insights to enhance energy conservation and carbon reduction in energy-intensive enterprises and optimize the sustainable operation of the electricity market.

关 键 词：电碳联合市场 高耗能企业 减碳行为 动态奖惩演化博弈 改进当量电价 

分 类 号：TM7[电气工程—电力系统及自动化]