制度性集体行动视角下城市群府际合作的内在逻辑——兼论我国城市群府际合作的特征与问题  

Internal Logic of Intergovernmental Cooperation in Urban Agglomerations from the Perspective of Institutional Collective Action——On Characteristics and Problematics of Relevant Practices in China

作　　者：杨海华[1] Yang Haihua(School of History and Public Administration,Yancheng Teachers University,Yancheng,Jiangsu 224002)

机构地区：[1]盐城师范学院历史与公共管理学院,江苏盐城224002

出　　处：《长江论坛》2025年第1期35-46,共12页Yangtze Tribune

基　　金：教育部哲学社会科学青年项目“制度性集体行动理论视角下我国城市群政府合作问题研究”(20YTC630186)。

摘　　要：制度性集体行动理论视角下,城市群府际合作的一般运作逻辑可被概括为:作为理性主体的地方政府基于预期合作收益-成本和合作风险的权衡与博弈,决定着府际合作的建立和具体执行;由于收益、成本和风险结构因博弈情境而异,合作机制选择必定是情境化的;按参与者结构和任务复杂程度由低到高排列,最常见的有效合作机制包括嵌入式、约束性契约式、授权式和国家权力纵向干预式等四种。以京津冀、长三角两大城市群为样本的观察表明,我国城市群府际合作总体呈现出制度性集体行动的逻辑,但国家权力纵向介入在所有重要城市群府际合作中占据主导地位是一大显著特征。尽管这在一定程度上体现了我国的制度优势,但长远来看也可能存在隐患。为此,应重视对国家权力介入方式的合理选择,并依据区域一体化政策过程的周期性规律分阶段地动态调整介入强度,为地方政府自主形成灵活有效的合作和培育合作网络预留必要的制度空间,避免因干预过度或干预刚性而对各种潜在的横向府际合作产生“替代”或“挤出”效应。From the perspective of institutional collective action theory,the general operational logic of inter-governmental cooperation in urban agglomerations can be summarized as follows:as rational actors,local gov-ernments determine the establishment and execution of intergovernmental cooperation based on the trade-offsof expected cocperation benefits,costs,and risks.Since the structures of benefits,costs,and risks vary with thegame context,the choice of cooperation mechanisms is inevitably contextual.The most common effective co-operation mechanisms,ranked from low to high in terms of participant structure and task complexity,includeembedded,binding contractual,delegated and state power vertical intervention mechanisms.Observations ofthe Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei and Yangtze River Delta urban agglomerations indicate that intergovernmental coop-eration in China's urban agglomerations generally follows the logic of institutional collective action,but aprominent feature is the dominant role of state vertical intervention in all major urban agglomeration coopera-tions.Although this reflects China's institutional advantages to some extent,it may pose long-term risks.There-fore,it is necessary to reasonably choose the methods of state power intervention,dynamically adjust the inten-sity of intervention according to the cyclical patterns of regional integration policy processes,and reserve nec-essary institutional space for local governments to autonomously develop flexible and effective cooperationnetworks,avoiding the"substitution"or"crowding out"effects of excessive or rigid intervention on potentialhorizontal intergovernmental cooperation.

关 键 词：制度性集体行动理论 城市群府际合作 合作机制选择 国家权力纵向介入 

分 类 号：D035.5[政治法律—政治学]