冲突视角下董监高“不保真”行为研究:以赫美集团为例  

“Non-Guarantee”of Annual Report,Interest Conflict and Corporate Governance:The Case of Hemei Group

作　　者：郑琳青 王焰辉 唐明轩 Zheng Linqing;Wang Yanhui;Tang Mingxuan(School of Economics and Management,Fuzhou University,Fuzhou,Fujian,China 350108;School of Accounting,Nanjing University of Finance&Economics,Nanjing,Jiangsu,China 210023)

机构地区：[1]福州大学经济与管理学院,福建福州350108 [2]南京财经大学会计学院,江苏南京210023

出　　处：《当代会计评论》2024年第2期121-140,共20页Contemporary Accounting Review

基　　金：国家自然科学基金面上项目“环境规制、企业创新与产业转型升级:基于节能减排监管的理论与实证研究”(71872046);福建省社科规划社科研究基地重大项目“国家治理视域下完善财会监督机制研究”(FJ2023JDZ069);福建省社科基地重大项目“福建发展碳汇金融的体制机制与对策研究”(FJ2021MJDZ012);福建省创新战略研究项目“福建‘三创’环境测评与提升策略研究”(2023R0028)的资助

摘　　要：近年来,上市公司董事、监事和高级管理人员(以下简称董监高)对财务报告信息的真实完整准确发表“不保真”声明的行为(以下简称“不保真”行为)频发。本文以赫美集团为例,从董监高“不保真”行为实质上是大股东与董监高的竞争性冲突出发,深入分析这一冲突的成因、过程与结果,并进一步讨论如何有效规避该类冲突。研究发现,大股东与董监高的利益诉求差异是导致冲突的主要原因,冲突过程主要体现为面对大股东的利益输送行为,董监高认为“保真”风险过高,为规避定期报告延期披露造成的严重后果,试图通过“不保真”行为免除其信息披露责任。冲突结果表现为引发激烈的关系冲突,导致两败俱伤,企业经营受挫。进一步分析发现,为切实发挥异议权的违规信息发现功能,并防止其成为董监高免责的最佳策略,监管机构应要求董监高对异议事项履行必要的核查程序,陈述充分恰当的异议理由,合理行使异议权。本文为董监高“不保真”行为提供了新的理论解释,拓展了冲突理论的应用边界,有助于为监管部门规范董监高信息披露异议权的行使提供参考。In recent years,directors,supervisors,and executives(DSEs)of listed companies frequently issued statements that they cannot guarantee the truthfulness,completeness,and faithful representation of financial reports(“‘nonguarantee’behaviors”,hereafter).The“non-guarantee”behaviors are essentially a competitive conflict between the majority shareholders and DSEs.We take the Hemei Group as an example to analyze the causes,process,and consequences of such conflict and discuss how to avoid it effectively.We find that the conflict results from the conflict of interests between the major shareholders and DSEs.The risks associated with providing a guarantee for the truthfulness and faithful representation of financial reports are too high due to the majority shareholders’tunneling behaviors.In order to circumvent the severe consequences of delaying periodic reports,DSEs attempt to free themselves from the fiduciary duties through the“non-guarantee”behaviors.The abovementioned conflict will also result in intense relational disputes and a nowin situation,which undermines business operations.Further analysis reveals that,in order to allow the DSEs to utilize their rights to dissent from wrongdoings and irregularities,and to prevent the DSEs from using the“non-guarantee”behaviors as a disclaimer,regulators should require the DSEs to perform necessary verification procedures on dissent matters and to provide sufficient and appropriate reasons for the dissent.This paper provides a new angle for explaining the prevalence of DSEs’“nonguarantee”behaviors,contributes to the literature on the application of conflict theory,and helps regulators to oversight the DSEs’properly exercising their rights to dissent.

关 键 词：董监高“不保真”行为 冲突理论 董监高异议权 

分 类 号：F830.91[经济管理—金融学]