旧工业区拆除废弃物资源化利用演化博弈研究  

Research on evolutionary game of resource utilization of demolition waste in old industrial areas

作　　者：田卫[1] 关小杰 柴庆 李颖 周梓淳 TIAN Wei;GUAN Xiaojie;CHAI Qing;LI Ying;ZHOU Zichun(School of Civil Engineering,Xi'an University of Architecture and Technology,Xi'an Shaanxi 710055,China)

机构地区：[1]西安建筑科技大学土木工程学院,陕西西安710055

出　　处：《工业安全与环保》2025年第3期104-110,共7页Industrial Safety and Environmental Protection

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(51908452)。

摘　　要：在考虑旧工业区拆除废弃物污染性的基础上,构建了政府、建设单位和回收企业之间的三方演化博弈模型,分析了三方博弈模型演化达到均衡时的策略选择稳定性及其稳定性条件,并对理想均衡策略进行了仿真分析。结果表明:政府采用不同的监管方式对三方的策略选择均影响显著;建设单位和回收企业对不达标(高污染)废弃物回收费用的定价更加敏感;回收企业的策略受自身无害化处理程度影响显著。研究结果可为后期政府完善相关政策及标准制定提供理论依据和有效建议。Based on the consideration of the pollution potential of demolition waste in old industrial areas,a three-party evolutionary game model among the government,construction units and recycling enterprises is established.The model analyzes the stability of strategy choices when the game reaches equilibrium and the conditions for that stabi-lity,and simulates the ideal equilibrium strategy.The results show that the government's use of different regulatory ap-proaches significantly affects the strategy choices of the three parties.Construction units and recycling enterprises are more sensitive to the pricing of the recycling fees for non-compliant(high-pollution)waste.The strategies of recycling enterprises are significantly influenced by the degree of harmless treatment of the waste.The research results provide theoretical support and effective recommendations for the government to improve relevant policies and standards in the future.

关 键 词：旧工业区拆除废弃物 资源化利用 演化博弈 仿真分析 

分 类 号：X705[环境科学与工程—环境工程]