演化博弈视角下矿山生态修复EOD模式主体行为策略  

Stakeholder Behavioral Strategies in the EOD Mode for Mine Ecological Restoration from an Evolutionary Game Perspective

作　　者：彭婵 谢红彬[1] PENG Chan;XIE Hongbin(School of Geographical Sciences/School of Carbon Neutrality Future Technology,Fujian Normal University,Fuzhou 350117,China)

机构地区：[1]福建师范大学地理科学学院/碳中和未来技术学院,福建福州350117

出　　处：《福建师范大学学报(自然科学版)》2025年第2期125-132,148,共9页Journal of Fujian Normal University:Natural Science Edition

基　　金：国家自然科学基金面上项目(41871208)。

摘　　要：新时代生态文明建设宏观背景下,厘清矿山生态修复各参与主体的利益关系,是推进修复工作高效进行的核心策略。基于生态导向开发模式(EOD),构建了涵盖地方政府、矿山企业和社区居民的三方动态演化博弈模型,探讨了各主体行为策略选择及其互动机制。以福建省W矿山生态修复实践为案例,运用数值模拟技术,分析不同因素对系统动态演化的影响。研究结果表明:(1)三方主体行为策略选择受各主体投入成本、综合收益预期、初始参与意愿、地方政府奖惩制度与补贴力度等多重因素综合影响;(2)提高各主体初始参与意愿可使系统加速演化至地方政府严格监管、矿山企业完全治理、社区居民主动参与的生态修复模式;(3)地方政府通过设置合理的奖惩制度可激发各方参与积极性,但奖惩力度过大可能会削弱政府的监管动力,调整惩罚力度对矿山企业行为策略选择的直接影响相对有限,而提升社区居民主动参与意愿的关键在于实施更加有效的激励措施与制定有效的补贴政策。Under the macro background of ecological civilization construction in the new era,clarifying the interest relationships among stakeholders involved in mine ecological restoration is a core strategy for advancing efficient restoration efforts.Based on the ecology-oriented development(EOD)mode,this study constructs a dynamic evolutionary game model involving three principal stakeholders:local governments,mining enterprises,and community residents.The study explores their behavioral strategy choices and interaction mechanisms through a case study of the ecological restoration of W Mine in Fujian Province.Employing numerical simulation techniques,the study analyzes the impact of various factors on the dynamic evolution of the system.The results indicate that:(1)The behavioral strategy choices of the three stakeholders are influenced by multiple factors,including the investment costs,expected comprehensive benefits,initial willingness to participate,and the reward-punishment system and subsidy intensity established by the local government.(2)Enhancing the initial participation willingness of all stakeholders can accelerate the system's evolution towards the ecological restoration state,characterized by strict regulation by local governments,comprehensive remediation by mining enterprises,and active involvement of community residents in ecological restoration.(3)Local governments can promote participation by establishing reasonable incentive mechanisms and punitive measures.However,overly stringent penalties may weaken their regulatory motivation.While adjusting penalty intensity has a relatively limited direct impact on the behavioral strategies of mining enterprises,enhancing the active community residents'participation willingness relies on implementing more effective incentive measures and well-designed subsidy policies.

关 键 词：演化博弈 模拟分析 矿山生态修复 EOD模式 利益主体 

分 类 号：X321[环境科学与工程—环境工程]