基于演化博弈的工程索赔中寻租行为的研究  

Research on Rent-seeking Behavior in Engineering Claim Based on Evolutionary Game

作　　者：张贵华 张文卓 王威昊 岳庆慧 ZHANG Guihua;ZHANG Wenzhuo;WANG Weihao;YUE Qinghui(School of Management Engineering,Qingdao University of Technology,Qingdao 266520,China)

机构地区：[1]青岛理工大学管理工程学院,山东青岛266520

出　　处：《工程管理学报》2025年第1期114-120,共7页Journal of Engineering Management

摘　　要：通过构建承包商、监理工程师和业主三方之间的演化博弈模型,求解系统稳定均衡点的条件,用Matlab软件进行仿真实验,识别并分析导致寻租行为的关键因素,进而分别从业主和承包商的角度对各自的行为选择问题进行探讨,并从业主的角度提出了避免工程索赔寻租问题的策略。结果表明:业主监管成功的概率,业主监管成本,寻租成本,惩罚力度的大小是影响三方博奔的关键因素。降低监管成本,加大寻租惩罚力度,通过优化监管策略并建立完善的监督机制,以此提高业主监管成功的概率有助于降低寻租风险。An evolutionary game model was constructed for the contractor,supervising engineer and owner,and the conditions for a stable equilibrium were determined.A simulation experiment was then conducted using Matlab.the key factors that lead to rent-seeking behavior were identifed and analyzed,and then their respective behavior choices from the perspective of the owner and the contractor were discussed,and propose the strategy to avoid the rent-seeking problem of engineering claims from the perspective of the owner was proposed.The results show that the probability of successful supervision of owners,the cost of supervision of owners,the cost of rent-seeking,and the size of punishment are the key factors affecting the three-party game.Reducing regulatory costs,increasing rent-seeking penalties,and improving the probability of successful owner supervision by optimizing regulatory strategies and establishing a sound supervision mechanism will help mitigate rent-seeking risks.

关 键 词：工程索赔 演化博弈 寻租行为 

分 类 号：TU723.1[建筑科学—建筑技术科学]