平台经济中纵向共同滥用市场支配地位行为的竞争法规制  

Competition Law Regulation over Vertical Collective Abusive Conduct of Market Dominance in Platform Economy

作  者:黄宏宇 HUANG Hong-yu(School of Law,Central South University,Changsha,Hunan,410012,China)

机构地区:[1]中南大学法学院,湖南长沙410012

出  处:《西华大学学报(哲学社会科学版)》2025年第2期104-114,共11页Journal of Xihua University(Philosophy & Social Sciences)

摘  要:平台经济的发展和数字技术的革新使得平台生态系统中以平台经营者和平台内相对优势经营者为主体的纵向共同滥用市场支配地位行为频发,市场支配地位与具体滥用行为因纵向经济关系而发生分离,因平台经营者市场支配力和平台内相对优势经营者的相对竞争优势和具体滥用行为的共同因果关系而具有反竞争效果。现行《反垄断法》以市场支配力推定规则规制共同滥用行为,规则的相对模糊性和横向规制的定式功能导致反垄断规则难以应对纵向共同滥用行为。由此,应积极确立禁止共同滥用行为规则的独立性和科学性,具化纵向规制功能,并在厘清竞争二法制度鹄的、实施机制和衔接经验的互通性基础上,探索衔接适用竞争二法的规制路径。The development of the platform economy and advances in digital technology lead to frequent vertical abuses of dominant market positions within platform ecosystems,primarily controlled by platform operators and platform-based operators with comparative advantages.The separation of market dominance from specific abusive practices stems from the vertical economic relationship between these entities,while the combined market power of platform operators and the competitive advantages of platform-based operators generates anti-competitive effects through their causal link to such abuses.Current Antitrust Law addresses common abuses via market power presumption rules.However,vague regulatory frameworks and a bias toward horizontal regulation hinder efforts to tackle vertically linked abuses.Consequently,regulations targeting collective abusive conduct should prioritize scientific rigor and independence,strengthen vertical regulatory oversight,and align Antitrust Law with other competition laws by clarifying enforcement mechanisms and cohesive interoperability.

关 键 词:平台经济 纵向共同滥用行为 平台经营者 平台内相对优势经营者 

分 类 号:D912.29[政治法律—民商法学]

 

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