数字平台自我优待行为:经济结果与政策启示  

Digital PlatformSelf-Preferencing Behavior:Economic Outcomes and Policy Implications

作　　者：吴汉洪[1] 王正洋 

机构地区：[1]中国人民大学经济学院

出　　处：《竞争政策研究》2025年第1期5-22,共18页Competition Policy Research

基　　金：国家社科基金重大课题“数字经济时代竞争政策定位与反垄断问题研究”(项目批准号:23&ZD077)的阶段性研究成果。

摘　　要：本文构建了一个纵向产品质量差异化模型,分析了平台实施自我优待行为对市场参与者福利水平的影响。结果表明:平台模式选择依赖于平台进入特定产品市场的固定费用以及产品的边际生产成本。在价格竞争效应与产品多样性效应的共同作用下,消费者剩余在平台选择双模式时更高。平台是否实施自我优待行为取决于该行为的具体类型以及平台与第三方卖家的产品质量差异。本文的研究结果为反垄断监管提供了较新的思路。This study constructs a vertical product quality differentiation model to analyze the impact of platform mode choice and its self-preferencing behavior on the welfare of market participants.The results indicate that platform mode choice depends on the fixed investment to enter a specific product market and the marginal production cost of the product.Consumer surplus is higher when the platform chooses dual mode compared to when it operates solely as a marketplace,as consumers benefit from both the price competition effect and product variety effect.Whether the platform engages in self-preferencing behavior depends on the specific nature of such behavior and the quality difference between the platform’s own product and that of third-party sellers.Our findings provide some insights for antitrust regulation.

关 键 词：平台模式选择 自我优待 纵向差异化模型 

分 类 号：F49[经济管理—产业经济] F274