考虑碳排放多级利用的综合能源系统两阶段混合博弈共赢策略  

Two-stage Mixed-game Win-win Strategy for Integrated Energy System Considering Multi-stage Utilization of Carbon Emission

作　　者：万屹 侯慧[1] 戈翔迪 王晓晖 卢艳超 汪颖翔 WAN Yi;HOU Hui;GE Xiangdi;WANG Xiaohui;LU Yanchao;WANG Yingxiang(School of Automation,Wuhan University of Technology,Wuhan 430070,China;Xiangyang Xiangzhou Electric Power Supply Company,State Grid Hubei Electric Power Co.,Ltd.,Xiangyang 441000,China;State Grid Economic and Technological Research Institute Co.,Ltd.,Beijing 102209,China;Economics and Technology Research Institute,State Grid Hubei Electric Power Co.,Ltd.,Wuhan 430077,China)

机构地区：[1]武汉理工大学自动化学院,湖北省武汉市430070 [2]国网湖北省电力有限公司襄阳市襄州区供电公司,湖北省襄阳市441000 [3]国网经济技术研究院有限公司,北京市102209 [4]国网湖北省电力有限公司经济技术研究院,湖北省武汉市430077

出　　处：《电力系统自动化》2025年第5期69-79,共11页Automation of Electric Power Systems

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(52177110);深圳市科技计划资助项目(JCYJ20210324131409026)。

摘　　要：针对多个综合能源系统(IES)参与碳交易市场与绿证交易市场,提出一种考虑碳排放多级利用的IES两阶段混合博弈共赢策略。构建包含碳捕集与碳封存、碳转移与碳利用、阶梯式碳交易及绿证-碳抵消机制的多级碳排放管理策略。同时,考虑到不同IES间的能源需求与交易策略不同,提出一种基于Stackelberg博弈-非对称纳什合作博弈的IES交易方法。微网运营商(MGO)与各IES间交易形成Stackelberg博弈,IES间通过非对称纳什合作博弈实现能源共享与碳排放多级利用。最后,以某工业园区为例进行验证。结果表明,IES间的碳排放多级利用机制能够显著降低各IES的碳排放成本,提高系统运行灵活性,且MGO针对不同IES的能耗需求进行差别定价可提高MGO的收益。IES联盟通过非对称纳什议价确定能源共享价格,以减少对MGO的依赖,实现联盟效益最大化。Aiming at the participation of multiple integrated energy systems(IESs)in the carbon emission trading(CET)and green certificate trading(GCT)markets,a two-stage mixed-game win-win strategy for IESs considering multi-stage utilization of carbon emission is proposed.A multi-stage carbon emission management strategy is constructed including carbon capture and storage,carbon transfer and utilization,cascaded carbon trading,and green certificate-carbon offset mechanisms.Meanwhile,considering the difference in energy demand and trading strategies among different IESs,an IES trading method based on Stackelberg gameasymmetric Nash cooperative game is proposed.The trading between microgrid operator(MGO)and IESs is a Stackelberg game,and the energy sharing and multi-stage utilization of carbon emissions are realized through asymmetric Nash cooperative game among IESs.Finally,a certain industrial park is taken as a case for verification.The results show that the multi-stage utilization mechanism of carbon emissions among IESs can significantly reduce the carbon emission cost of each IES,improve the flexibility of system operation,and the differential pricing of MGO based on the energy consumption demand of different IESs can increase the revenue of MGO.The IES alliance determines energy sharing prices through asymmetric Nash bargaining to reduce the dependence on MGO and maximize the alliance benefits.

关 键 词：综合能源系统 碳排放 多级利用 能源共享 混合博弈 碳交易市场 绿证交易市场 

分 类 号：F42[经济管理—产业经济]