论科创公司的治理——柔宇科技失败案例的启示  

Governance of Sci-Tech Innovation Corporations——Insight from the Failure Case of Royole Corporation

作　　者：辛清泉[1] 梅斌 XIN Qingquan;MEI Bin(School of Economic and Business Administration,Innovation Research on Corporate Finance and Accounting Governance,Chongqing University,Chongqing,China,400030;School of Economic and Management,Chongqing Youth Vocational&Technical College,Chongqing,China,400712)

机构地区：[1]重庆大学经济与工商管理学院,重庆大学公司财务与会计治理创新研究院,重庆400030 [2]重庆青年职业技术学院经济管理学院,重庆400712

出　　处：《当代会计评论》2024年第3期20-35,共16页Contemporary Accounting Review

基　　金：国家自然科学基金面上项目(71872022);重庆青年职业技术学院年度科研项目(CQY2016JXY03)的资助

摘　　要：本文以柔宇科技失败案例作为研究对象,主要运用不完全合同理论,对科技创新公司(简称科创公司)成长过程中的治理问题进行初步分析。我们认为,科技型人力资本与财务资本的权力配置与动态调整是科创公司治理的核心问题,在投资合同中设置以业绩信号为基础的控制权配置及调整条款是非常重要的。另外,本文也对科创公司的重资产和轻资产两种发展模式及其治理问题进行了初步讨论。我们认为,科创公司需要谨慎作出独立进行大规模量产的战略选择,科创企业与产业资本的合作生产更有助于实现优势互补,从而降低企业失败的风险。本文对于理解和改进我国科创公司的公司治理具有一定的现实意义。This paper conducts a case study on the failure of Royole Corporation.We analyze the governance issues emerging in the growth of sci-tech innovation enterprises(STIEs)using the incomplete contract theory.We argue that power allocation and dynamic adjustments of high-tech human capital and financial capital are core issues in corporate governance for STIEs.It is important to include terms of allocation and adjustment of control rights based on performance in investment contracts.Furthermore,this study explores two development models for STIEs,the heavy-asset and light-asset models,and discusses the governance concerns of each model.We caution STIEs against undertaking large-scale mass production independently.Instead,collaborating with industrial capital that enables complementary advantages can effectively reduce failure risks.This paper provides practical insights for understanding and enhancing corporate governance of Chinese STIEs.

关 键 词：科创公司 治理 不完全合同理论 柔宇科技 

分 类 号：F830.9[经济管理—金融学]