“概念法学”的神话与祛魅:以普赫塔的“概念的谱系”和耶林的“自然历史方法”为主线——兼论维亚克尔的经典近代私法史叙事  

The Myth and Disenchantment of“Jurisprudence of Concept”:Puchta’s“Genealogy of Concept”and Jhering\s“NaturalHistorical Method”as the Main Lines—On Wieacker's Classic Narrative of History of Modern Private Law

作　　者：肖伟[1] XIAO WEI

机构地区：[1]武汉大学法学院

出　　处：《中德法学论坛》2023年第1期242-270,共29页

摘　　要：“概念法学”是后期耶林给早年的自己、萨维尼和普赫塔等19世纪的“学说汇纂法学家”贴上的极具争议性的负面标签。自由法运动和利益法学进一步采纳并利用这一标签,来阐明各自方法论的正确性。维亚克尔最终在其近代私法史叙事中,将“概念法学”神话推到了顶峰。“概念法学”由此意味着不顾及生活实践的,纯粹形式逻辑演绎的,追求无漏洞的法律体系的法学范式方法。但这一神话完全脱离了19世纪具体的历史和文本语境,例如,普赫塔的“概念的谱系”和早期耶林的“自然历史方法”并非“概念法学”的代名词,它们本身实际上有着丰富的面向和意涵。就此而言,维亚克尔的经典近代私法史叙事应当通过语境化的具体研究被反思和检视。“Jurisprudence of concept” is the highly controversial negative label that the later Jhering gave to “Pandektisten” in the nineteenth century, such as himself of the early years, Savigny and Puchta. Movement of free law and jurisprudence of interest further adopted and used this label to clarify the correctness of their respective methodologies. Wieacker eventually brought the myth of “jurisprudence of concept” to its peak in his narrative of modern private law history. “Jurisprudence of concept” thus implies paradigm and method of jurisprudence that disregards life practice, is purely deductive in formal logic, and seeks a flawless legal system. But this myth is completely divorced from the specific historical and textual contexts of the nineteenth century. For example, Puchta\s “genealogy of concept” and the “naturalhistorical method” of Jhering of the early years are not synonymous with “jurisprudence of concept”, instead they have rich aspects and connotations. In this regard, Wieacker\s classic narrative of modern private law history should be reflected upon and examined through contextualized and specific studies.

关 键 词：概念法学 耶林 普赫塔 近代私法史 维亚克尔 

分 类 号：D92[政治法律—法学]