养老金奖惩机制对个人偏好退休年龄及基金可持续性的影响  

The Effects of Pension Rewards and Penalties on Individuals Preferred Retirement Age and Fund Sustainability

作　　者：石晨曦 朱洪鹏 Shi Chenxi;Zhu Hongpeng

机构地区：[1]重庆工商大学金融学院

出　　处：《财政科学》2024年第12期102-117,共16页Fiscal Science

基　　金：国家社科基金青年项目“个人退休决策视角下渐进式延迟退休年龄对基本养老保险的影响研究”(项目编号:21CSH069)。

摘　　要：我国已实施渐进式延迟法定退休年龄,个人偏好退休年龄与政策预期退休年龄是否一致,可通过奖惩机制进行引导。本文考虑个人参保与退休行为往往不完全理性,分析在新政策下劳动者的非理性退休年龄偏好,并进一步融入“精算中性”的奖惩函数,结合计发月数、缴费年限等政策参数变动,探讨其在偏好退休年龄的引导效果。研究发现:基于精算中性测算的奖惩因子,对于男性的奖励和惩罚均大于女性;提高最低缴费年限和计发月数对劳动者的退休偏好影响不显著;引入奖惩机制有助于平滑劳动者的退休偏好,有效抑制延迟退休的“厌恶”情绪,从而引导劳动者自愿延迟退休,尤其对于理性劳动者的引导效果更加明显;建立激励约束机制后,可分别将男性和女性养老金财富提高约1%、0.34%,同时增加基金的可持续性。基于此,本文建议应尽快建立激励约束相容的养老金奖惩机制,并适时联动改革其他政策参数,以更好引导劳动者自愿延迟退休。China has implemented a gradual delay in the statutory retirement age.Whether individuals'preferred retirement age aligns with the expected retirement age set by the policy can be guided through a system of incentives and penalties.This paper considers that individuals'participation in insurance and retirement behavior is often not fully rational.Therefore,it analyzes the irrational retirement age preferences of workers under the new policy and further incorporates an"actuarially neutral"incentive and penalty function.By examining changes in policy parameters such as the number of months of benefit distribution and years of contribution,it explores the guiding effects on preferred retirement age.The study finds that:Based on the actuarially neutral measurement of incentive and penalty factors,both rewards and penalties for males are greater than those for females;Increasing the minimum contribution years and the number of months for benefit distribution does not significantly affect workers'retirement preferences;Introducing an incentive and penalty mechanism helps smooth workers'retirement preferences and effectively suppresses the"aversion"to delayed retirement,thereby guiding workers to voluntarily delay their retirement,especially with a more pronounced effect on rational workers;After establishing an incentive and constraint mechanism,the pension wealth of males and females can be increased by approximately 1%and 0.34%,respectively,while also enhancing the sustainability of the fund.Based on this,the paper suggests that an incentive-compatible pension reward and penalty mechanism should be established as soon as possible,along with timely reforms of other policy parameters to better guide workers in voluntarily delaying retirement.

关 键 词：激励约束相容 累积前景理论 养老金财富 非理性决策 

分 类 号：F840.67[经济管理—保险]