博弈均衡视角下我国农业保险的发展困境及对策研究  

Research on the Development Dilemma and Countermeasures of China's Agricultural Insurance from the Perspective of Game Equilibrium

作　　者：李鑫达 LI Xinda(School of Marxism,Hohai University,Nanjing 211100,China)

机构地区：[1]河海大学马克思主义学院,南京211100

出　　处：《东北农业科学》2025年第1期107-112,共6页Journal of Northeast Agricultural Sciences

基　　金：中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助项目(B230207015)。

摘　　要：本研究从博弈均衡的视角分析了我国农业保险的发展困境并提出了相应的对策建议。研究表明,政府补贴、风险控制以及法律体系的完善是提升农业保险市场效率、保障农民利益、促进农业可持续发展的关键因素。通过模型构建和实证分析,本研究为农业保险财政补贴制度及风险调控机制的创新提供了理论依据和政策建议。This article analyzes the development dilemma of China′s agricultural insurance from the perspective of game equilibrium and puts forward corresponding countermeasures and suggestions.The article points out that government subsidies,risk control,and the improvement of the legal system are key factors to improve the efficiency of the agricultural insurance market,protect farmers′ interests,and promote sustainable agricultural development.Through model construction and empirical analysis,the article provides theoretical basis and policy suggestions for the innovation of the financial subsidy system for agricultural insurance and the risk control mechanism.

关 键 词：农业保险 利益偏好 博弈均衡分析 风险调控 政府补贴 

分 类 号：F840.66[经济管理—保险]