尊严可以构成人权的基础吗?  

Can Dignity Constitute the Basis of Human Rights?

作　　者：雷磊[1] Lei Lei

机构地区：[1]中国政法大学

出　　处：《人权研究》2025年第1期13-29,共17页Chinese Journal of Human Rights

基　　金：2021年度教育部哲学社会科学研究后期资助重大项目“时代镜像中的法理学研究”(项目批准号:21JHQ012)。

摘　　要：人权的证成无法采取实在法进路、政治进路、事实进路、宗教和文化进路,而必须采取普遍的道德证立方式。对此,一种建构性形而上学必不可少,而尊严就是这种形而上学内含的基础性价值。虽然在人权的证成上基础论无法避免,但不必将尊严视为人权的唯一基础,而可以主张将尊严作为人权基础之一的多元基础论。尊严可被界定为一种包含一系列人权的规范性能力和地位。在此前提下,人的尊严不构成人权的历史基础和效力基础,也不必构成其内容基础,但可以构成人权的释论基础。这意味着可以运用尊严对人权的价值内涵进行更全面和充分的解释,以及在具体情境中对保护特定人权的重要性进行强化论证。由此,探讨尊严与人权的关系就不仅具有理论意义,同时也显示出其实践意义。Human rights cannot be justified by positive law,political,factual,religious and cultural approaches,but must be justified by a universal ethical approach.For this,a constructive metaphysics is indispensable,and dignity is a foundational value embedded in this metaphysics.While foundationalism is unavoidable in the justifi cation of human rights,it is not necessary to consider dignity as the sole foundation of human rights,but rather a pluralistic foundationalism that considers dignity as one of the foundations of human rights can be advocated.Dignity can be defi ned as a normative capacity and status that encompasses a range of human rights.On this premise,human dignity does not constitute the historical or valid basis of human rights,nor does it have to constitute the basis of their content,but it can constitute the interpretative basis of human rights.This means that dignity can be used to provide a more comprehensive and adequate interpretation of the value of human rights,as well as to strengthen the argument for the importance of protecting particular human rights in specifi c situations.In this way,exploring the relationship between dignity and human rights not only has the theoretical signifi cance,but also demonstrates its practical significance.

关 键 词：人权 尊严 建构性形而上学 规范性能力和地位 释论基础 

分 类 号：D082[政治法律—政治学]