项目组合视角下中央政府奖惩对牵头企业水生态治理效果的影响  

The Influence of Central GovernmentIncentives and Sanctions on the Effectiveness of Water Ecological Governance in Leading Enterprises from the Perspective of Portfolio

作　　者：汪群 陈旭[2] 卢婷 WANG Qun;CHEN Xu;LU Ting(School of Management Engineering Nanjing Institute of Technology,Nanjing 211167 China;Business School Hohai University,Nanjing 211100 China)

机构地区：[1]南京工程学院管理工程学院,江苏南京211167 [2]河海大学商学院,江苏南京211100

出　　处：《南京工程学院学报(社会科学版)》2024年第4期45-55,共11页Journal of Nanjing Institute of Technology:Social Science Edition

基　　金：江苏省社会科学基金项目“‘双碳’目标下数字赋能江苏水生态协同治理路径与机制研究”(23GLD006);南京工程学院引进人才科研启动基金项目“多方协同下长江水生态治理牵头企业特殊社会责任实现的合作机制与对策研究”(YKJ202321)。

摘　　要：在黄河流域生态保护和高质量发展战略背景下,牵头企业在履行水生态治理特殊社会责任的同时,面临治理成本高、经济回报低等挑战。中央政府的奖惩政策对企业的治理决策和治理效果有重要影响。然而,当前研究缺乏对中央政府奖惩、牵头企业履行特殊社会责任与水生态治理效果之间动态关系的系统分析。本研究从项目组合视角出发,构建了基于战略期多阶段的中央政府奖惩—牵头企业履行特殊社会责任—治理效果动态影响模型,并采用双层嵌套多种群遗传算法对其进行求解。研究结果表明,中央政府的奖惩力度与治理效果呈现倒“U”型关系,过度奖励或过度惩罚均可能导致治理效果下降,且企业在不同战略阶段的项目组合策略受奖惩力度影响显著。此外,牵头企业更倾向于在战略期初期履行最低特殊社会责任以降低罚款,在中后期集中实施高回报项目以获取奖励,从而实现收益最大化。研究提出了优化奖惩机制、强化考核监督、提升企业治理能力等政策建议,为中央政府制定水生态治理激励政策和企业优化治理决策提供了理论支持和实践指导。In the context of ecological protection and high-quality development strategies within the Yellow River Basin,leading enterprises encounter challenges such as high governance costs and low economic returns while simultaneously fulfilling their distinct social responsibilities related to water ecological management.The reward and punishment policies implemented by the central government play a crucial role in shaping enterprises' governance decisions and their subsequent outcomes.Nevertheless,existing research lacks a systematic analysis of the dynamic interplay between central government incentives,the commitment of leading enterprises to fulfill specific social responsibilities,and the effectiveness of water ecological governance.This study adopts a project portfolio perspective to develop a dynamic impact model that integrates multi-stage strategic periods,linking central government incentives and sanctions with leading enterprises' fulfillment of special social responsibilities and governance outcomes.A two-layer nested multiple cluster genetic algorithm is employed to solve this model.The findings indicate that there exists an inverted “U” shaped relationship between the intensity of central government incentives/sanctions and governance effectiveness.Both excessive rewards and punishments may result in diminished governance outcomes.Furthermore,the project portfolio strategies employed by enterprises at various strategic stages are significantly shaped by the intensity of these incentives/sanctions.Additionally,the leading enterprises often engage in only the most basic forms of social responsibilities during the early stages of strategy implementation.This approach serves to mitigate potential penalties while allowing them to focus on high-return projects in subsequent stages,thereby maximizing the overall rewards.This research provides policy recommendations designed to optimize incentive/sanction mechanisms,reinforce assessment supervision,and enhance the capabilities of corporate governance.These sug

关 键 词：牵头企业 特殊社会责任 水生态治理效果 战略期 项目组合 多种群遗传算法 

分 类 号：F224.33[经济管理—国民经济]