位置拍卖、移动端互联网平台与社会福利——理论机制与经验证据  

Position Auction, Mobile Internet Platform and Social Welfare: Theoretical Mechanism and Empirical Evidence

作　　者：蔡祖国 李世杰 CAI Zuguo;LI Shijie(International Business School,Hainan University;School of Economics,Nankai University)

机构地区：[1]海南大学国际商学院,570228 [2]南开大学经济学院,300073

出　　处：《经济研究》2025年第1期160-176,共17页Economic Research Journal

基　　金：国家自然科学基金青年科学项目(72303049)、国家自然科学基金地区科学项目(71963012)的阶段性成果。

摘　　要：互联网平台位置拍卖行为能否有助于社会福利提升,是业界、学界共同关注的问题,但鲜有文献探讨移动端互联网平台位置拍卖行为如何影响社会福利。本文结合消费者搜索效率与搜索成本理论,构建移动端互联网平台优化位置拍卖市场的理论模型,探究移动端互联网平台位置拍卖行为对消费者福利与销售商流量的影响机制;并结合国内大型电商平台的消费者数据,讨论移动端互联网平台位置拍卖行为如何实现三方共赢。研究发现:在位置拍卖行为情形下,不同类型搜索结果的穿插式排序整体上提升消费者福利,契合互联网平台企业追求利润的内在激励,但抑制了销售商竞标付费搜索结果列表的动态位置;而互联网平台设计不同类型搜索结果的成列排序,可以激励销售商持续参与位置拍卖,从而形成稳定的移动端网络平台位置拍卖市场——自然搜索结果列表依据销售收入排序,能够筛选出增加平台利润的优质销售商;付费搜索结果列表则依据消费者需求排序,可以帮助参与位置拍卖的销售商精准获知消费者需求,实现收益最大化。More and more mobile Internet platform enterprises have implemented position auctions in recent years. They usually adopt a combination of fixed positions and dynamic positions to order the paid search result lists. Meanwhile, they integrate the organic search result lists with the paid ones, resulting in an interleaved ranking design where paid and organic search results are interspersed and alternate with each other. Previous research has pointed out that the interleaved ranking design can enhance the dynamism of paid search results, better aligns with consumer preferences, and help sellers obtain higher click-through or purchase rates, compared with the ranking design where different types of search result lists are independent of each other(i.e. the separate ranking design). However, there is little discussion on whether the interleaved ranking design can achieve the consistency of consumer welfare, seller revenues and platform profits, which constitutes the core focus of position auctions on Internet platforms. Furthermore, given the relatively recent development of the mobile Internet market, the mechanism by which platform position auctions affect social welfare and its implementation effects have not been fully discussed. Accordingly, this paper attempts to conduct in-depth analysis and systematic thinking.Based on the search cost theory and the search efficiency theory, this paper adopts the research paradigm of “ theoretical model + empirical test” to examine the impact of position auctions on mobile Internet platforms on platform profits, seller revenues and consumer welfare. We try to explore the motivations for mobile Internet platforms to implement position auctions, and then analyze the consistency of the interests among the three parties regarding position auctions. Next, we discuss the strategic choices of mobile Internet platforms to encourage sellers to participate in position auctions. Our findings show that position auctions on mobile Internet platforms can indeed improve social welfare,

关 键 词：移动端互联网平台 位置拍卖 社会福利 消费者福利 

分 类 号：D632.1[政治法律—政治学] F724.59[政治法律—中外政治制度]