平台反垄断中竞争损害认定的反思与调适  

Identifing Competitive Harm in Platform Anti-Monopoly:Rethinking to Make an Adjustment

作　　者：吴佩乘 WU Pei-cheng

机构地区：[1]浙江大学光华法学院,浙江省杭州市310008 [2]浙江大学数字法治实验室,浙江省杭州市310008

出　　处：《南京大学学报(哲学.人文科学.社会科学)》2025年第1期67-75,158,159,共11页Journal of Nanjing University(Philosophy,Humanities and Social Sciences)

基　　金：国家社会科学基金青年项目(23CFX028);浙江省法学会法学研究重点课题(2024NA18)。

摘　　要：随着全球主要司法辖区均加强了在平台经济领域的反垄断活动,平台反垄断的核心争议聚焦在如何认定垄断行为造成的竞争损害。芝加哥学派主张的经济效率标准在平台经济的反垄断法适用中屡遭质疑,其主要问题在于平台竞争中价格维度的竞争作用显著下降,平台垄断可能引发对个人信息、隐私、创新等的新型损害。平台竞争并未脱离市场竞争的一般规律,数字平台在商业实践中运用的各种价格和非价格竞争手段可能造成多样的竞争损害形式。在平台经济领域,反垄断执法机构有必要根据数字平台的竞争过程,分析其竞争方式,进而在个案中判断具体的竞争损害。我国反垄断执法机构应当完善平台反垄断执法理念,并在处理不同案件时适用基本一致的竞争损害分析框架,从而稳定经营者市场预期,促进平台经济健康规范发展。As major jurisdictions worldwide intensify their anti-monopoly enforcement in the platform economy,the core debate over platform anti-monopoly centers on how to identify competitive harm caused by monopolistic behaviors.The Chicago School's economic eficiency standard has been time and again challenged in the digital platform economy.The primary issue lies in the diminished role of price competition,with platform monopolies potentially leading to such new forms of harm as risks to personal information,privacy,and innovation.Platform competition remains subject to general market competition principles.Digital platforms employ both price and non-price competitive strategies,which may lead to varied forms of competitive harm.In the field of platform economy,anti-monopoly enforcement authorities must examine digital platforms'competitive processes and business models to assess the specific nature of competitive harm on a case-by-case basis.China's anti-monopoly law enforcement authorities are expected to refine their regulatory approaches,and employ a generally consistent competition harm analysis framework when dealing with various instances to stabilize market operators'expectations and support the healthy and standardized growth of the platform economy.

关 键 词：平台反垄断 竞争损害 竞争过程 平台经济 

分 类 号：D92[政治法律—法学]