政府参与视角下新农人助力乡村振兴的演化博弈分析  

Evolutionary Game Analysis of New Farmers Supporting Rural Revitalization from the Perspective of Government Participation

作　　者：祝静 陈国毅 ZHU Jing;CHEN Guoyi(College of Business Administration,Chongqing Three Gorges University,Chongqing 404000,China)

机构地区：[1]重庆三峡学院工商管理学院,重庆404000

出　　处：《科技和产业》2025年第5期356-362,共7页Science Technology and Industry

基　　金：重庆市社科联社会组织项目(2021SZ24);重庆市教委科学技术项目(KJQN202301221);重庆市教委人文社会科学研究项目(24SKGH244)。

摘　　要：新农人在丰富农业业态、带领农户致富以及促进产村融合等方面发挥了重要作用。针对政府和新农人助力乡村振兴中存在的投入产出不均衡、双方合作关系不稳定等问题,通过构建政府-新农人演化博弈模型,研究双方的策略选择演化路径,并利用数值仿真对影响双方决策的因素进行分析。结果表明,演化稳定策略受成本、额外收益、间接损失和补贴的影响,成本越大,双方行为策略演化为不参与的速度越快,额外收益、间接损失和补贴的增加则有助于双方向助力乡村振兴的策略演化,当一方参与,另一方不参与时,参与一方的行为无效。New farmers play a crucial role in enriching the forms of agricultural industry,leading farmers to get rich and promoting the integration of industry and village.To address the problems such as unbalanced input-output and unstable cooperative relations between the government and new farmers,an evolutionary game model of government and new farmer was constructs to study the evolutionary path of strategy selection between the two sides,and the factors affecting the decision-making of both sides by using numerical simulation were analyzed.The results show that the evolutionary stability strategy is influenced by costs,additional benefits,indirect losses and subsidies.The higher the costs,the faster the evolution of behavioral strategies into non-participation to assist in rural revitalization.The increase of additional gains,indirect losses and subsidies contributes to supporting rural revitalization of both sides,when one party participates in rural revitalization while the other party does not,the behavior of the participating one will be invalid.

关 键 词：乡村振兴 新农人 演化博弈 数值仿真 

分 类 号：F306[经济管理—产业经济]