政府奖惩机制下港口危化品储存安全监管博弈分析与仿真  

Evolutionary game analysis and simulation of port hazardous chemical storage safety supervision under a governmental reward and punishment mechanism

作　　者：史俊伟[1] 钱浙安 叶雨晴 董潇 SHI Junwei;QIAN Zhean;YE Yuqing;DONG Xiao(School of Management Science and Engineering,Shandong University of Technology and Business,Yantai 264005,Shandong,China;College of Emergency Management and Safety Engineering,China University of Mining and Technology,Beijing 100083,China;Shandong Luhai Heavy Industry Co.,Ltd.,Yantai Port Group,Yantai 264000,Shandong,China)

机构地区：[1]山东工商学院管理科学与工程学院,山东烟台264005 [2]中国矿业大学应急管理与安全工程学院,北京100083 [3]烟台港集团山东陆海重工有限公司,山东烟台264000

出　　处：《安全与环境学报》2025年第3期1045-1056,共12页Journal of Safety and Environment

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(72274111)。

摘　　要：为探究政府部门、港口与危化品企业利益相关者在危化品储存安全监管过程中的策略选择行为,基于演化博弈理论,引入静、动态奖惩机制,构建港口危化品储存安全监管的动态演化博弈模型,并对不同情景下各方策略选择行为及其演化过程进行仿真。结果表明:当港口损失大于港口违规、合规储存收益差与港口新增储存成本之和时,系统可以达到理想稳定最优策略(弱监管,合规储存,合作);在静态奖惩机制下,政府激励、政府惩罚等对港口合规储存和危化品企业合作都是正向激励;在动态奖惩机制下,政府惩罚上限越高,港口和危化品企业选择合规运营的概率就越高,随着政府奖励上限逐渐增加,港口和危化品企业选择合规运营的概率反而呈降低趋势;降低港口的合规运营安全投入成本,建立严格准入制度和实施分类监管,对危化品企业的不安全合作行为有效约束,可实现港口危化品储存向高效安全监管方向的演化。To analyze the strategic choice behavior of government departments,ports,and stakeholders in hazardous chemical enterprises regarding the safety supervision of hazardous chemical storage,researchers employed evolutionary game theory to construct a dynamic evolutionary game model involving the government,ports,and hazardous chemical enterprises.Firstly,the game relationships among stakeholders in the safety regulation of hazardous chemical storage are discussed.Model assumptions are proposed,and parameters are set and assigned across different scenarios.By referencing examples,the payoff matrix and the replication dynamic equation are derived.Additionally,the equilibrium point of the game system and its stability conditions are analyzed.Finally,MATLAB is used to analyze the dynamic evolution of various strategy choices under different scenarios.The influence of relevant variables on the three-party evolutionary game is explored,and the impact of these variables on the strategic choices of the three parties is examined.Based on the sensitivity analysis,strategy optimization methods are then proposed.The results indicate that when the port's losses exceed the combined value of the revenue difference between non-compliant and compliant storage,along with the cost of new storage facilities,the system evolves toward an optimal stable strategy characterized by weak policing,compliant storage,and cooperation.Under the static reward-and-punishment mechanism,government incentives and penalties have a positive impact on port compliance and cooperation with hazardous chemical enterprises.Under the dynamic reward-and-punishment mechanism,a higher ceiling on government penalties increases the likelihood that ports and hazardous chemical enterprises will adopt compliant operations,whereas a higher ceiling on government rewards decreases this likelihood.Additionally,reducing ports'compliance operating costs and safety investments,establishing strict licensing systems,and implementing tiered supervision effectively constrains uns

关 键 词：安全社会工程 安全监管 奖惩机制 演化博弈 策略选择 

分 类 号：X924[环境科学与工程—安全科学]