基于三方演化博弈的森林横向生态补偿策略及其稳定性——以重庆市为例  

Forest Horizontal Ecological Compensation Strategy and Its Stability Based on Three-Party Evolutionary Game:a Case of Chongqing City

作　　者：余红红 杨加猛[1] Yu Honghong;Yang Jiameng(College of Economics and Management,Nanjing Forestry University,Nanjing 210037;School of Economics and Management,Changzhou Institute of Technology,Changzhou 213032)

机构地区：[1]南京林业大学经济管理学院,南京210037 [2]常州工学院经济与管理学院,常州213032

出　　处：《林业科学》2025年第3期214-232,共19页Scientia Silvae Sinicae

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目“森林生态效益横向补偿机制与实现路径研究”(20BGL171)。

摘　　要：【目的】横向生态补偿是引导多元主体参与区域生态环境治理的重要举措,探究森林横向生态补偿过程中的政府主体行为选择,以促进森林生态保护、协调地区公平发展。【方法】构建森林生态保护地区、森林生态受益地区和中央政府三方演化博弈模型,探索森林横向生态补偿不同发展阶段的三方主体决策和演化路径,结合重庆市2020年实际数据仿真分析重庆市森林横向生态补偿机制建设进展及主要参数变化对博弈系统的影响。【结果】在森林横向生态补偿不同发展阶段,博弈主体会达到不同的稳定均衡点,初期地方政府之间无法自发达成合作,需要中央政府监管,待森林横向生态补偿机制成熟后,即使中央政府不实施监管,地方政府之间也能实现合作;重庆市当前处于森林横向生态补偿发展阶段前期,三方博弈主体最优策略集合为“保护”、“补偿”、“监管”;森林生态保护地区与受益地区基层政府对上级(重庆市)政府奖励和惩罚的敏感性存在差异,森林生态受益地区基层政府对奖励金额的敏感性更高;补偿金额大小会影响地方政府达到稳定状态的时间和决策选择,公众媒体参与程度高低与博弈三方主体达到稳定均衡状态的速度呈正比。【结论】森林横向生态补偿发展过程存在阶段性特征,重庆市当前处于发展阶段前期,上级政府的奖惩金额、补偿金额和公众媒体的参与程度会对三方博弈主体策略选择产生重要影响。基于此,从上级政府、森林生态保护地区和森林生态受益地区基层政府等角度提出相关建议:1)上级政府应主导建立森林横向生态补偿协商机制,推动协议达成,并通过完善监管制度、制定差异化奖惩机制、动态调整奖惩力度,确保补偿成效与资金效率;2)森林生态保护地区政府应依托本地资源,发展林业生态产业,拓展林下经济、康养旅游和文创�【Objective】Horizontal ecological compensation is an important initiative to guide multiple subjects to participate in regional ecological environment governance.It is important to study the choice of governmental subject behavior in the process of forest horizontal compensation to promote forest ecological protection and coordinate equitable regional development.【Method】This paper constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model involving forest ecological protection areas,beneficial areas,and the central government.It explores the decision-making and evolutionary paths of the three parties at different stages.Based on the actual data of Chongqing in 2020,this paper conducts a simulation analysis to examine the progress of Chongqing’s forest horizontal ecological compensation mechanism and the impact of changes in key parameters on the game system.【Result】The results show that the players of the game will reach different stable equilibrium points in different development stages.In the initial period,the cooperation between local governments cannot be reached spontaneously,which requires the supervision of the central government.When the forest horizontal ecological compensation enters the mature period,the cooperation between local governments can still be achieved without the supervision of the central government.Chongqing is currently in the early stage of the developmental period,and the optimal strategy of the tripartite game players is“protection,compensation and supervision”.The grassroots governments in forest ecological protection areas and beneficial areas have different sensitivity to the rewards and punishments of the the superior government(Chongqing),and the grassroots governments in forest ecological beneficial areas have higher sensitivity to the reward amount.The amount of compensation fees can affect the time and decision making of the local government to reach the stable state.The degree of public media participation is directly proportional to the speed at which the three parti

关 键 词：横向生态补偿 森林 利益相关者 演化博弈 公众媒体 重庆市 

分 类 号：S7-9[农业科学—林学] F307.2[经济管理—产业经济]