外卖配送无人接单问题的平台监管与商家激励策略研究  

Research on Platform Supervision and Merchant Incentive Strategies for Unattended Food Delivery Orders

作　　者：田甜 苑慧静 唐加福[1] 刘玉学 Tian Tian;Yuan Huijing;Tang Jiafu;Liu Yuxue(School of Management Science and Engineering,Dongbei University of Finance and Economics,Dalian 116012,China;Key Laboratory of Liaoning Province for Data Analytics and Decision-Making Optimization,Dalian 116012,China)

机构地区：[1]东北财经大学管理科学与工程学院,辽宁大连116025 [2]辽宁省大数据管理与优化决策重点实验室,辽宁大连116025

出　　处：《中国管理科学》2025年第2期184-194,共11页Chinese Journal of Management Science

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目(23YJC630162);辽宁省教育厅基本科研项目面上项目(LJKMZ20221579);国家自然科学基金项目(71831003,72272027);大连市科技人才创新支持政策实施计划项目(2022RG17)。

摘　　要：外卖配送无人接单问题是O2O外卖配送服务中众包骑手资源分配不合理所致,但其本质是配送收益分配机制(即餐饮商家激励策略)和平台监管问题。本文针对外卖平台的征收服务费和抽佣两种收费模式以及集中监管和分开监管两种监管方式,考虑平台监管力度、商家现金激励策略和骑手完成配送服务的努力程度,分别建立了四个由平台、餐饮商家和骑手构成的三方博弈模型,并通过求解纳什均衡得到最优决策和最优利润。研究发现:(1)引入平台监管策略和商家现金激励策略有利于骑手的总接单量和利润的提升;(2)若商家给出现金激励,则激励金额等于产品的毛利,商家销售产品的毛利不超过产品价格的2/3时,平台监管和商家激励才有可能给商家带来增额利润;(3)骑手的努力程度与平台收费模式有关。The problem of unattended delivery orders in O2O food delivery services is caused by unreasonable allocation of crowd-sourcing riders,but its essence is the revenue distribution mechanism(i.e.catering merchant incentive strategy)issue and delivery platform supervision issue.In this article,it focuses on two platform charg⁃ing modes and two platform supervision methods,platform supervision effort,merchant cash incentive and rider delivering effort are considered,four tripartite game models are built whose players are the same,including the delivery platform,the catering merchant and the crowd-sourcing riders,and Nash equilibrium is solved to get the optimal decisions and profit.It is found that:(1)After introducing platform supervision and merchant cash incen⁃tive,the number of orders the riders accept and the riders’profit are both improved.(2)If the merchant chooses to provide incentives,all gross profit of the product will be used as incentive.When the product’s gross profit does not exceed 2/3 of the product’s price,platform supervision and merchant incentives may bring additional profits to the merchant.(3)Rider delivering effort is related to platform charging modes.

关 键 词：外卖配送 无人接单 平台监管 激励策略 三方博弈 

分 类 号：O225[理学—运筹学与控制论]